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THE DIPLO~IATIO YEAR.
SmvARD has thrown down another challenge to the world.
Ile has issued a volume-rather more than twice as thick as the
one he printed a year ago-containing his annual corrc::,pondence with all the nations of the earth. Ile imites criticismor he sets it at <lefiance; and in neither case, can he or his
admirers, (of whom he no doubt has some,) complain, if it be
fair and manly. Such is the aim of the following pages-the
"Titer at the outset pledging himself to demonstrate, that }Ir.
Seward's pretensions to scholarship, to statesman:-hip, or to enlightened patriotism in dealing with the foreign, or, so far as he
has had to do with them, the domestic relations of our afflicted
country, are utterly without foundation.
One disclaimer the ttuthor of these pages thinks it due to
himself to make. In this, or any other adverse criticism, he is
conscious of no motive of private resentment-no sense of personal wrong. At the same time, he cannot (.lisguise from those
who take the trouble to read what he writes, that, viewing Mr.
Lincoln's Secretary of State as the author and willing abettor
of the systematic outrages on the liberty of the citizen-on the
freedom of thought, of speech, and of the press-which haye
deformed the government and disgraced the people (inasmuch
as they submitted to them)-so regarding him, the author would
be recreant to the principles of freedom in which he has been
nurtured-faithless to the profession to which he is proud to
belong, but which i\Ir. Seward, (himself a lawyer,) has insulted,
MR.
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if he sought to repress the sentiment of indignation at the
manifold wrongs that have been done-or the less elen1.ted
feeling, which literary and political imposture always ought to
inspire.
It was )fr. Seward who initiated the system vf arbitr:iry
arrests, and who has made, so far as in him lay, the names of
Lafayette, and Warren, and 1Icllenry, infamous. It was he
who caused at least one person to be arrested, and when he
bought his way out of gaol by a discreet application of moneythe possession of which, in Bank of England notes, was his imputed crime-treated the arrest and the prisoner's suffering
with a coarse jocularity at which Mr. Lincoln's kind feeling
revolted, though jocularity rarely comes amiss to him. It was
Mr. Seward who, without authority, even from his chief, and as
is generally understood from private pique, dating as far back
as the formation of the cabinet, imprisoned the Mayor of Washington, and was forced to release him by Mr. Lincoln's peremptory order. It was he who immured in a series of Bastiles
the iiarylan<l gentlemen-men of refinement, cultivation and
unblemished clrnracter-rclying, in the case of one of them, on a
document, which proved to be a forgery, as evidence of guilt.
Ile continued to hold his post in the cabinet after the bloodiest
of outrages-for such it literally was-had been committed under
its authority, in the arrest of Judge Carmichael, who was beaten
and dragged by solLliers from the bench to prison. It was .i\Ir.
Seward who, while he kept his innocent countrymen, his own
immediate fellow-citizens, in prison, discharged Gilchrist, the
Englishman, who had been held by judicial warrant and remamled after a full hearing before a judge. It was 1Ir. Seward
who apphtuded the l)rovost-i\Iarshal at Washington for resisting
a habeas corpus for a minor, and threatening to imprison, or,
indeed, imprisoning the officer who brought it. It was .i\Ir.
Seward who placed a sentinel at Judge Merrick's door, for the
1louble and kindred purposes of insult to him and intimidation
to the electors of :Maryland, and so avowed it.* It was he who

* Lord Lyons, in writing to Earl Russell, Nov. 41 18Gl, snys: '' )Ir. Sewurd
snid that he lrnd already sent we a written answer respecting the seven senmen,
and that as to the recent arl'ests, they had almost all been made in view of tho
)farylnnd elections; that those elections would be 01•er in about a week's time,
and that he hoped then to be able to set at liberty all the British subjects now
under military nrrest." Parliamentary Papers, No. 1, p. 102.
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issued the orders of November, 1861, forbidding the State prisoners to employ counsel, saying that he would find in such intervention "a<l<litional reasons for declining to release them."
It was Mr. Seward who, at the very time when he was ostentatiously availing himself of the services of Prelates abroad,
denied to a prisoner in Fort Warren the privilege of seeing a
parish priest, in a letter recently published, which, though
expressed with such clumsiness that no one can tell whether
Yigilance was directe<l at the penitent or the priest, is, in any
interpretation, most discreditable.* These are some of the
home doings of the Secretary of State which, entirely aside from
the shortcomings and follies, and worse than follies of his foreign policy, excuse the strong and earnest and resentful feeling
with which every American, be he writer or reader, critic or
student, must regard him. It may be found convenient at this
late day, and in the face of public opinion in the North, for :\Ir.
Seward's friends to pai~t him as a conservative and moderate
man; but the memory of these wrongs, and the official records
"1Vhich we propose to examine, are too fresh and will be too permanent ever to admit of this. The reader will make what
allowance he pleases for the influence on the writer's judgment
of the feeling he thus proudly avows.
Now let us look at this new volume of imposture and note its
history, the circumstances of its publication, and, within certain
limits, its contents. All are characteristic.
Daunted no doubt by the strictures made on every side, a year
ago, on the self-abnegation into which Mr. Seward seduced the
President in relation to foreign affairs, he issues this volume
under different auspices. Mr. Lincoln, in his odd way, does say
something about foreign relations. Out of the twenty-one

* "DEPARTM&NT ov ST.ITE, '\VASIIIXGTON, Nov. 20, 1861.
"Sm: I hnve to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 15th inst.,
with a copy of that which you addressed to Colonel Dimick, on the 15th NoTember. This Department, having adopted a role which precludes all visits to
political prisoners, even from Ministers of the Gospel of any denomination , has
hitherto strictly observed it. If, however, the persons themselves shall, in the
event of sickness, or any other reasonable cause, require the services of their
spiritual advisers, the rule will be relaxed in favor of any one of undoubted
loyalty.
To the Rev. A. L. Illrs&LBERER, Boston College."
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printed pages of the Message, three are devoted to this topic of
admittc<l interest, and in these, arc at least two statements of
fact, on important points, for which nlr. Lincoln of course is
only inclircctly responsible, which the evidence shows to be
utterly groundless. One is this-and we dismiss it incidentally,
if for no other reason, because the Chief l\Iagistratc has as little
to do with tho main drama of diplomacy as the chorus in one of
Shak:-<pcaro's histories. He speaks a few words at the beginning, and then is heard no more. I t is a pity those few words
,,ere not more truthful.
"In the month of June last," says the Mcsimge, "there were
some grounds to expect that the maritime powers which at the
beginning of our domestic difficulties, so unwisely and unnecessarily, as we think, recognised the insurgents as a belligerent,
would soon recede from that position which has proved only less
injurious to themselves than to our own country."
llcre is a Jl0sitiYc averment made to Congress that, in June,
1862, before the reverses on the Chickahominy, there were
grounds to expect the European powers would withdraw their
belligerent recognition. 'l'hcre can be no mistake about it.
The fact is clearly stated. Tho time is distinctly marked.
Now, a reference to llfr. Seward's despatches shows this was
not so, an<l. that at no time, least of all in Juno, was there any
groun<l. even for the hope. 'J'his is susceptible of clear proof.
On the 15th May, 1862, 1Ir. Adams wrote a despatch describing bis pathetic appeal to Earl Russell, when he "supplicated
his Lordship" to withdraw from the position Great Britain had
thus far chosen to assume. "I supplicated bis Lordship, then,
not to compel me to go without the possession of the smallest
eYidencc that could refute the inevitable arguments that would
be drawn from the position that Great Britain had thus far
chosen to assume during this struggle." The Earl's answer to
this rather undignified appeal is not given, but could not ham
been farnrablc, or it would luwc been printed. On the 22d of
1\Iay, :Mr. Adams writes that ho had renewed his application
with "little expectation of success," and this time was not disappointed; for he says: "Ilis Lordship replied that he dicl not
see his way to any change of policy at present," and added (we

.I
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fear with that grim sarcasm which statesmen occasionally indulge in) that "we seemed to be going on so fast ourselves that
the question might settle itself before a great while." These
letters were received in Washington from the 1st to the 10th of
June, and not another word from l\lr. Adams on this subject is
to be found during the month, or at any time. So far, then, as
England was concerned, 1\Ir. Lincoln was utterly mistaken.
How was it with France?
As early as May 5th, 1\Ir. Seward wrote to our l\linister there
on this subject, remarking with his characteristic felicity of diction that "It will be a. study for the historian why the European powers on the first sound of the bugle of faction, so absolutely abandoned all their former faith in the Government and
people of the United States." On the 16th, l\Ir. Dayton, in a
postscript, says 1\fr. Adams had told him of his failure in London, and he thinks he had better not be importunate in Paris ;
and on the 22d he wrote that "without further aid he could do
nothing." On the 26th, the sa.me thing was repeated, with the
addition of the expression of a hope that the Rebels might not
know of the failure, for, says he, in italics, "A knowledge of
the denial of the application would very much encoumge the
rebels in their hopes." On the 2d of June, l\Ir. Dayton says,
"I have already informed you to what extent this point has been
pressed upon the attention of the French Government, and
scarcely suppose, you desire me, under existing circumstances,
to go further. Indeed after what has been saicl here, I don't
see how it is possible to do so at present." This despatch was
received on the 6th June, and was communicated to the President, so i.\fr. Seward distinctly says, and on the 20th, he wrote
to l\Ir. Dayton a long harangue (for it can be called by no other
name,) about "the popular mass surged by the voice of demagogues," and "a Confederacy of discordant States bound by a
flaxen cord," and on the same day, it being l\Ir. Seward's fashion
to write at least two despatches, (on one day he wrote three,)
per diem, he sends one which we print in full, in order to clinch
the demonstra,tion that, when Mr. Lincoln in his message saitl
that, in June, there was ground to expect the European powers
would withdraw their recognition of the South as a belligerent,
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he ought to have known, and his Secretary of State did know,
that he was saying what was not true.*
"While the President regrets that, in your opinion, there is
"no immediate prospect of success in inducing the Government
"of France to rescind the declaration of neutrality which it
" adopted last year, he docs not at all doubt the fidelity and
"earnestness with which you have presented the subject; and
"he has intended to leave, as ho still loaves, the prosecution of
"that object to your own discretion, in which he reposes the
"utmost confidence. A change of position by the maritime
"powers is, in his judgment, essential to an early and complete
"restoration of commerce between this country and Europe.
"But the interest of those powers in that restoration is now
"fully as great as our own. llaving submitted our convictions
"with frankness, and enforced them with arguments derived
"from a full knowledge of tho condition of things in this country,
"we can now cheerfully leave tho subject to the consideration
"of parties so deeply interested. It is proper that you should
"understand that the British and French Governments do not
"at all hesitate to suggest to us continual modifications of a
"blockade, unquestionably la"ful in all respects, with a view to
"facilitate their acquisition of cotton, while the concessions al,, ready made, seem to the President to entitle us to the exercise
"of some reciprocal liberality on their part."
But why this falsification ? Tho secret is revealed in the
sentence of the Message which follows the one we have quoted,
and which was written when l\Ir. Lincoln's military antipathies
wore at a white heat, and when everything, defeat at home, disappointment abroa<l, was to be attributed to military failures.
He says immediately after speaking of this alleged frustration of his hopes abroad, "But the temporary reverses which
afterwards befel the national arms, and which were exaggerated
by our own disloyal citizens abroad, have hitherto delayed that
act of simple justice."
Herc then is another positive assertion which we regret to say
is equally groundless. 'l'ha,t there were military reverses,
especially on the Peninsula, during the closing week of June,

* The only possible authority for the statement in the Message is a rumor
that reached )Ir. Ad!\ms io August, and which be suys he did not credit.
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from the battle on the 26th to the arrival at Ilarrison's Landing on the 2d July, is certainly true. It was one of the weeks of
Mr. Lincoln's panic at Washington, when and he his counsellors
had so directed the Federal army as to scatter it fruitlessly eYcrywhere, and to prepare it for the crushing defeat of a month
later. But Mr. Seward could, or would not see reverses, and
was busy issuing prophetic bulletins to his agents abroad, which
quite justify the bad name the word has earned. Arch-Bishop
IIughcs had been attending to the ultramontanists on the Continent; Bishop Mcllvaine was in England, taking care of
Lord Shaftesbury and the evangelicals; and l\Ir. Wecd was
directing the Prelatical team. "The army of General McClellan," wrote l\Ir. Seward, on the 2d June, "will be rapidly
strengthened, although it is already deemed adequate to the
capture of Richmond." "No American now indulges any doubt
that the integrity of the Union will be triumphantly maintained!" On the 24th, he adopted a pensive and intc1jcctional
style to Mr. Adams, "You tell me that in England they point
to the delays at Richmond and Corinth, and they enlarge upon
the absence of displays of Union feelings in New Orleans and
Norfolk. Ah! well, skepticism must be expected in this world
in regard to new political systems, insomuch as even the Divine
revelation needs the aid of miracles to make converts to a new
religious faith."* On the 30th, the day of the bloody battle of
Malvern IIill-on this day of sorrow and blood-the sound and

* ;\[r. Sewnrd is fond of what we may call the interjectional style. In e.
letter to the .Mini~ter in Belgium who, in a fit of despondency, h1\d written recommending some tampering with the press-the nature of which docs not appear,
the despatch being suppressed, the Secretary snys : " Bow could we Mtempt to
regulate the press of Jforope when we cannot rcgulato our own? Where are
the funds which would be necessary? Who the agent that could be trusted
with them? What an endless cbnpter of political intrigues sbonld we not be
opening I Who in our country bas the skill to conduct them? No, 110,"
(p. 660.) Apropos of the press nbroad, there is a dispatch fron:: Mr. Motley
(p. 571) which warrants the suspicion that the foreign press is sometimes enlisted iu the Federal cause. He sends to the Department and it is reprinted
here, a long extract from a Yicnnesc paper, which concludes with a passage
which Mr. Motley mny understand, but we do not, "Nothing is easier thltn to
show up apparent inconsistencies and resthetical shortcomings in many of Mr.
Lincoln's actions of state as is done by the English Pindars of slavery, the Times,
and Saturday Review."

10
scent of which rcachetl for many a long mile, the Secretary
was in the City of New York on one of those strange ubiquitics
which seem, now-a-days, to afilict Secretaries and Presidents,
taking counsel with Governor l\Iorgan and l\Ir. W ced, and talking jocularly for the newspapers. In his absence, Mr. F. W.
Seward wrote abroad that " everything was right, and that
General McClellan was nearer Richmond than before, and held
his ground," and a week later, l\Ir. Scwanl himself wrote what
now ,re read with wonder, that " every one of the battles was
a repulse of the insurgents, and the two last which closed the
series were decided victories," that General :McClellan's modest
conduct," (such was then the cue) '' will be read with interest
and aclmiration," winding up with one of the strange flourishes
with which he concludes not a few of these odd documents.
"If, as fatalists argue, a certain quantity of human blood
must flow to appease the dreadful spirit of faction, and enable
a discontented people to recover its calmness and its reason, it
may be hoped that the needful sacrifice has now been made.
If the re1)l'escntatiYc parties(?) had now to choose whether they
would have the army whero it is and as it is, or back again
where it was and as it was, it is not to be doubtecl that the insurgents would prefer to it the position aud condition on the
Pamunkey, and the friends tl1c one now attained on the bank
of the James. The insurgents and the world abroad will see
that the virtue of the people is adequate to the responsibility
which Providence has cast upon them."
Now, while we do not, in the least, doubt that the virtue of
the })coplc is adequate to any responsibility, we may be excused, after such a rigmarole as this, for a little distrust of the
virtue of some of those "ho have been elevated a little above
the popular level.
The truth is, that if there were reverses which disloyal men
exaggerated, Mr. Seward throughout, even to his confidential
agents, prcsistcd in denying them-that these reverses, whether
precisely stated or exaggerated, h.ul no such influence abroad
as :\Ir. Lincoln now attributes to them; and that the whole fabrication of pretended effect and cause is an unworthy afterthought designed to carry out the sy~tcm of malignant spite
at the Peninsular Generals, which began with l\IcClcllan's re-
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moval in NoYember and en<led (if it has ended) in the dismissal
of General Fitz John Porter in January.
Thus di<l :i\Ir. Lincoln, at Ur. Seward's bidding usher in his
reference to foreign relations, with what we may mil<lly term
a misrepresentation. It would have been better for his fame,
(if such a word can be so applied,) if, as last year, he had said
nothing about them.
But we do not stop here. The message thus opens, "The
correspondence touching foreign affairs, which has taken place
during the last year, is herewith submitted, in virtual compliance with a request to that effect mtulc by the House of Representatives near the close of last session of Congress." One
would suppose from this, that Congress had expressly or, by
implication, solicited the publication of this huge volume. No
such thing was dreamed of.
On reference to the record we £nd that, on the 0th of June,
18G2, :;,\fr. Cox, a Democratic member from Ohio and one of
the Committee of Foreign Affairs, offered what we suppose to
be the resolution referred to. It is not very precise in its terms.
It has no reference to future correspondence. l\Ir. Cox a<:eompanied it with a brief speech, in the course of which he said
that, as Pa.rlia!llent had published part of the correspon<lcncc,
he wished to h::we any omission supplied.* IIe then achletl, he
was happy to sa,y that he could confirlcntly assure the House
that the best understanding existed between us and the European powers. Every one familiar with the action of Congress
knows that between the State Department and this Committee
there is and ought to be a close sympathy-a semi-confidential
relation which overrides political opposition. In fact, urnlcr
existing circumstances, Mr. Cox, Democrat, from Ohio, is closer
in affinity to the Secretary than some of his party friends, certainly more so than the Chairman of the Senate Comiuittec. Such
a resolution would not have been offered, or such an authoritative

* The .\Iinistry did lay before Parliament .\Ir. Seward's correspondence of
1861, printing it from the copy be fnrni3hed, omitting nothing, adding nothing.
What the moti\·e was, we do not pretend to didnc. )Ir. Cobden, in his 3peecb
last summer at Rochunle, intimated that the intention was not at nil complimcntnr_,. Lord Lyons' dispatch to Bari Russell, sending a copr of it is ,·ery
sigoificant.-Pnrliamentary Papers, Xo. J., p. 115.
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speech made, but at the prompting, or with the concurrence of
the Department. Yet, on the day that J\Ir. Cox was at the
suggestion of :\:Ir. Seward, felicitating himself and us on the prospect of the perfect tranquillity of our foreign relations, and
fancied he saw
" The birds of calm brooding on the charmed wa,o."

on that very day, the Secretary, at the other end of the avenue,
was writing a pettish despatch to r.Ir. Adams, showing his
regret and the President's at the very unsatisfactory condition of things. "It is impossible," said he, "here to
understand the policy by which the British GoYernment is persuaded that the sensibilities of this country upon the subject of
its sovereignty aml true independence, in such a crisis as this,
can be wisely disregarded." Mr. Cox was deceived. '1'herc
1·eally, in all this, seems to have been a tendency to indirectness, a facility of disingeuuousness which threatens to revive
for Mr. Seward the nick-name long ago affixed to a British
Statesman-the Malagrida of our diplomacy.
One other remarkable instance of the same sort of thing may
be cited, and with it, we dismiss this very disparaging and unpleasant view of i\Ir. Seward's public action.
On the 12th of July, 1862, he wrote to Mr. Adams that
"This transaction will furnish you a suitable occasion for informing Earl Russell that since the Oreto and other gunboats
are being received by the insurgents from Europe to renew
demonstrations on our national commerce, Congress is about to
authorize the issue of letters of marque and reprisal, and that if
we £nd it necessary to suppress that piracy, we shall bring Privateers into service for that purpose and, of course, for that purpose only."
Herc again is a distinct and positive avcrment," Congress is
about to issue letters of marque and reprisal." Now, Congress
was about doing no such thing, and l\Ir. Seward knew it.
Never was there a more deplorable fiasco than the feeble attempt made by the Executh'c to induce Congress to authorise
letters of marque. A bill to that effect was introduced by Mr.
Grimes, of Iowa, on the 12th July, the date of Mr. Seward's
letter, and was met 'l\"ith such a storm of opposition from the
Republican Senators, that it was scarcely allowed to be read.

J
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It was called up two days later, the mover naively saying, that,
in introducing it, he was not representing himself or his own
opinions, but the wishes of the Administration, and on the 15th,
three days after tho Secretary liad said that " Congress is
about to authorize letters of marque," it was, by common consent, dropped-not a single Senator saying a word in its favor
-and has never been heard of since. It was not even allmlcd
to in the House of Representatives, and we search in vain in
this volume of despatches for any correction of this gricvou:,i
error or mis-statement. It looks Yery much as if the action of
Congress, such as it was, was invoked in order to verify :.\Ir.
Seward's threiit, and not that Mr. Seward told the truth as to
the action of Congress. And this is thought to be fair playthis is skilful diplomacy in the nineteenth century! In former
days we read of ambassadors of foreign States being watched
and their despatches stolen and reacl. Lord Chatham, who
was anything but a trickster, employed spies and detectives to
dog tho steps of tho French minister in London in 17Gl. Sir
Joseph Yorke was suspected of taking liberties with rebel concspontlence. i\fr. Fox and Lord Shelburne, though in the same
cabinet, had each an agent in Paris in 1782. Lord Malmesbury was not over-scrupulous. All sorts of devices were once
resorted to, and may be so still, for aught we know. But, in a
small way, :.\fr. Seward's tortuousness has no parallel, for he
seems to think that it is rather a clever thing to mislead one of
his own ministers abroad, as well as the Government to which he
is accredited, by the positive assertion of a fact which was no
fact, and then, not only never to correct the mis-statement, but
to publish it to th€ world as one of the trophies of his statesmanship. Ho has vastly improved on Sir Henry W ottons'
apothegm. It is no wonder that i\Ir. Adams was all the time
begging to be told the truth as to what was going on at home.*

* There is something touching in )Ir. Adnms· prayer for precise ioforma•
tiou, uttel'ed in nuswer to a tremendous essay on international eU1ics from tho
Secrotnry. "I do uot like," says !Jo, (p. 23) ·• to be obliged to confess, when
asked <jllestiood by persons who ought to k1101v, touching the mornments aud
policy of the Govornmeot, that I am not ablo to answer them." " l nru sometimes questioned here," wrote poor )Ir. Dayton, "by p11rties in the Go1·crnmeot, ns to the future conrdC of e1·ent.; in tile Cnitcd States, and fear [ indicate
no unwarrantable ignorance, for I no1 constrained to say tbat I kuow ootbiog
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Such arc some of the flagrant in~tances of want of canrlor.
11ot only in the papm, themselves, but in tho manner in which
they have been i11trotluced to tho public-and we willingly,
after this exposure," hich, for the sake of what is kft of our
country's character, we regret tho necessity of making, pass
this part of the subject by.
Defore considering the substance of this volume, let us-for
onr pledge of demolition extends to Mr. Seward's pretcmions
n:-; a scholar and a writcr-:,ay a few words on it:, literary
merits. It is, if po::;sihlc, wornc than Volume first. One would
think that at this time of <lay, in the effulgence of education,
no one would question that the style, the mode of exprc~:iion of
a Secretary of State, or eYen a l 1 rcsident, was a fair subject of
comment. Y ct there arc those who think, or pretend to think,
either, that anything like literary criticism ii, a smnll lnu,incss,
aud that, a:, in this ca~t', the gra,·c, didactic c:;s:iys, or the scribbling,,, the light cont1·ihutious from high executive officers,
are too i;acred to Le read or commented upon, except reYcrcntly. Believing, as we do, that no right thinking man can
write, we will not say IJadly, or clumsily, or ungrammatically, but
as ::\Ir. Scwnr1l writc,,-in other words, that no man, who writes
as ::\Ir. Sew:ml docs, can be a pt'rfcctly right-minded or clearsighted man; believing this, wo hold the writings of such men
pt'culiarly fit subject of criticbm. And so it is all the world
over. .A recent writer has well said that "'l'hcre is always a
dignified, ~traightfonrnnl way of :;aying thing,;, and the i;ooner
it is cultivated by those who frame puLlic documents which
all men arc expcctc<l to read, the better." lt is this i-implc
dignity of ><tylc, this straightforwardness, in which )Ir. Seward's
compositions are so deficient. To describe his rhetoric as sophomoric, is to use a mil<l term. It is radically defective in all the
clements of good style, nnd the more he writes, the worse it becomes. It i:; pretcntiou::; to an extreme point. It is i;tilted.
It is flippant. It is feeble. It is di:,trcssingly obscure. Ile is
grossly inacurate in his general knowledge, ancl yet excessively
fond of para,ling it on all occasions, fit and unfit. Ile indulges
in technicalities, and writes one day like a profes,,or of mebeyond wlrnt is common to all tbe worhl, while the Go1·crnrnent antl tliplomats
here take it for granted I ought to know a grcnt deal uiore.''-Yol. I., p. 240.
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chanics (p. 1 i!I), aucl the ne.xt like a hor$c-jockey lP· 105). Let
us rclievo the gravity of criticism by taking a few instances of

thi;., almost at random,-th1·owin,; perhaps into a note, for the
amusement, or it may be the a:-ctonisluncnt, of our rcallers, a
number of ~pl'cimens of literary lnmgli11g with which we <lo not
desire to lmr<lm our text. Two :-peciml'ns will suflice here.
'rhere is on the eastern side of ll111bon·s Bay, at least fifteen
degree~ of lo11gituck, and, 11~ the binl flie~, a thouHand miles
of 10easuremc11t from the sources of the .:\Iis"issippi, a re;;ion
called" Prince Rupert's T,aml," perfectly well kno,1n to every
student of .Arctic aclventure, and one woulcl ::<uppo~e, tu the
copyiJJg clerb in the State Departmc11t. ~[r. Seward, writing
on the 7th July to )Ir. A,lam~, of Commorlorc Farragut p:Ls,-ing
the batteries at Yickslmrg, ::;ays: "1'hus the ln,t obstacle tif the
navigation of the ~l ississippi hus been onircomc, arnl it is <•pen
to tra,k once more from the head wntt:rs of it-. tributarie,;, near
the Lakc-s all(l Prince Rupr:rt's £and, to the Gulf of ?llcxico !"
So m11ch for geog1·aJJhy; but histor~· fares wor,:c at the Secretary's lianJs. He calls the motto of the Order of the Garter
"the m•>tto of' the na.tioi1nl 1mns·• ! He nffirms with great stateli11C!'!\, i11 one of his most elaborate cssay11 011 rnatter., and things
in genera I, that " Uichclil'u occupie 1 and fortifiecl a large portion of this continent, extending from the Gulf of ~lcxico to the
Strait~ of Belle Isle." There is not a college boy who noes not
know that the Cardinal was in hie; quiet grave in the Sorbonne,
ancl hail been there thirty ycarfl, before the )li~sissippi was clisco,·erecl, either nt its source or its mouth. But let the passage
speak for itself.
"Hather than do this, I willingly turn away from the i'lpec" tacle of servile war and war ahrc,acl-of military <lcrnstation
"on land, and of a carniv:il of public :mil prirntc cupidity on
"the seas, which has bec•n 1wc-c;entecl lo me-to set down with
"cahnnes::; some reilection, c:ilculatccl to a,crt nn issue so unnc" cessnry an!l so fatal, "hich you may po~~ibly fin,l suitable
"occasion for suggesting to the rulers of Great Dritaiu. For
•· what was tl1iF1 groat C"ntinenl, brought up, as it were, from
"the <lcpths of what before hacl l1een k11owh ns 'the dark arnl
'' ,tormy ocean?' Diel the European States which fournl ancl
"occupied it, almo8t without effort, then un<lcrstand it:; real
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"!lcstiny and purposes? Have they ever yet fully understood
"an<l accepted tht•m? Ila;; anything but disappointment upon
"<lisappointment, and disaster upon disa:-.;ter, resulted from their
"rnisapprchcnsions? After near four hurnlrcd years of such
'· rlisappoi1,tmeuts anil dis:1sters, is the way of Providence in
"rcgartl to Americ,i still so mysterious that it cannot be un" derstood and confcsse<l '/ Columbus, it was sai!l, harl given a
"11cw world to the kingdoms of Castile and Leon. What has
'' become of the soYercignly of Spain in America'/ Richelieu
"(ICcupiccl an<l fortified a large portion of the continent, extend" ini! from the Gulf of ~Iexico to the Strait:, of Belk Isle. Docs
"France yet retain that important appcll<lagc to the crown of
'' her :sovereign'? Great Britain acrp1ircd a dominion here, sur' • pa~,-iug, hy an hundred fold in length ancl brea,lth, the native
"realm. Has not 1i large portion of it been alrently formally
'' rbigned? To whom ha,·c these nst dominions, with tho~e
'· fnnndml hy the Portugnc:<e, the Dutch, awl the Swedes, been
"n•signcd, but to Amedcan nation~, the growth of European
"euloni,:t,: :mJ exile,-, who haYc come hitlwr, hringin/.! with them
"the arts, the civilizatio11, and the virtues of Europe('
It is not to be wonclered at, that poor ~lr. ~\.dam,; groaned in
spirit under ~uch a style of de;;patch-writing as thi,-, in \\ hich
interrogation an,l declamation arc so strangely mixed, and
all the :-craps of imperfect lrnowlc,lge, hi~torical and ethnological, whicl, ~fr. Bt·,rnnl ever had, urc cullatcd in order to fill
the <liplomatic mail bag. It is, l10wcver, when poptry and histor.'· comhinc that the peculiaritil·s of the Secretary's rhetoric,
to use his farnritc phrase, ''culminate."* Witness the de:-patch
to :\Ir. lluney, on the 4th of August, in reply to the i11formation
natnrally enough l,!iven hy that gl•11tlema11, though in rather
grarnlilotp1ent phrase, that he h:111 atte11clc1l the ceremony of
lnying tl1<• corner-stone of a monument to Camocn~. Lest we
may do inju,-tice to this gem of the collection-for so ~Ir.
Sew.ml <'Yi1lently regards it-the despatch being exclusively
*Ina ~horl dcsp,lld1 to )Ir. )lotley (p. 550) he ,ays: "l\1ssion is as 11<11Urnl
n condition for nations as for indi..-id11111$. :--ecession 1s a popuhlr excittment,
di!turhnnce, pnssion. It was necilfnl that the new popular passion should
c11/111i11ate before it could be expedcrl to subside, and to do this, it must l1twe
time. The r11foiinati~11 111 home 11nd nbrolld could Ii~ hastened or delayed by
accident.''
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de,otecl to the one topic of the aclYenturous poet of the East,
we quote it in extenso, begging our reatlers to observe the
graceful allusion, at the end, to the Portuguese slave trade,
with which poor Camoens had no more to do than he had with
the discovery of the continent-he dying at Lisbon in 1579,
and the Portuguese traffic in slaves in this hemisphere beginning
in 1630.

'

"DEPARUIENT OF STATE,
"W,\SHINGTO~, August 4, 1862.

"Sm :-Your despatch of June 28, has been received. The
"erection of a monument in Lisbon to the memory of the im" mortal poet of l'ortugal was not merely an act of national
"justice and a proper manifestation of national pride. It illus" trated the eclectic, conservative faculty of nations, by which
" they rescue and save whatever is great, good, useful and
·' humane, from the wrecks of time, lea,Ying what is worthless,
·' vicious, or pernicious, to pass into oblivion.
" The incident seems doubtless the more pleasing to us, be" cause it occurs at this conjuncture, when we arc engaged in
"combatting, in its full development, a gigantic error which
·' Portugal, in the age of Camoens, brought into this continent.
"I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
,, w. H. SEWARD."
The whole correspondence with i!Ir. Haney, we may incidentally remark, is redolent of that rhetorical perfume to which
:\Ir. Seward is so much addicted. W c add a specimen-being
the first of the series-noting in pasoing our entire unconsciousness of the meaning or appropriateness of the opening
sentence, as to what the educational question is, and what Mr.
Harvey at Lisbon has to do with the French Emperor.
" WASUIXGTON, July 9, 1862.
"Sir :-Your despatch of June 5th was received. I think
'' the Portuguese government and nation arc to be congratulated
"upon the solution of the educational question, which the French
"Emperor has so quietly and promptly effected.
"How much the old European nations suffer from the immo" bility of classes and masses which this new nation ncccls ! We
" could receive and employ all the conscientious teachers of
" Ew·ope without fear of danger from their imputed heresies in

2
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"politics or in religion. France, Belgium and Englann are
" agitated an<l excited to make war against and destroy us by
" classes of persons thrown out of employment, who, if they
"should make their way here, would find abundttnt and harm" less occupation, with large rewards. Indeed, some of them
"might become founders of States which would, at no distant
"day, become as great as those which arc disordered by reason
" of their wants. Let us hope that the European mind may be
"sagacious enough to discern that the cure for all the social
"evils in both hemispheres is the migration of surplus population
'' to regions where population is deficient. If it docs not like
"us of the United States, why should Spanish America be
"longer left to languish for want of the invigoration which
"European emigration would afford."*
We haYe room but for t\Yo other ludicrous instances of Mr.
Seward's mode of composition.
In a despatch to the Dutch Minister, nir. Van Limburg; for
the Netherlands seem to have had trouble on both sides of the
Atlantic, with l\1r. Pike of the Tribune at the Hague, and
General Butler at New Orleans, i\1r. Seward thus oddly describes the functions of his own department :
" It appears beyond dispute tlrnt the person of the Consul
"was unnecessarily and rud.cly searched; that certain papers
"which incontestably were archives of the consulate were Reizccl
"and remoYed, and they are still withheld from him, and that
"he was not only denied the privilege of conferring with a
"friendly colleague but was addressed in very discourteous
"and disrespectful language. In these proceedings the military
"agents assumed functions which belong exclusively to the
"Department of State, acting under the directions of the Prcsi" dent."
For referring to the other, we crave some indulgence, being

* The practical good sense of the Portuguese Minister of State is shown in
his answer, so artlessly reported by :I.Ir. Har,ey, to the request to exclude the
Confederate steamers from the Western Isles. "The Viscount Bandeira. was
frank enough to say to me that the islands in question had been used and
abused by corsairs nnd pirates during centuries-that they were exposed and
unprotected, ntid therefore might be so employed again, and that our best plan
would be to send a sitjficimt force there to tYrotect American ships against threatmed depredatio11s, and to punish the criminal offendcrs."-Pilge 388.
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quite 1,urc that, wen' it founc1 anywhere but inn volnme of grnve
diplomatic papers, its grossness wonlcl be incxcusa hle. En:m
as it is, we refer to it cautiously. ']'here i::t-cYery :t1lnlt r<•a,ler
is aware-a euphemism hy "hich whPn a hou~cholcl i~ )!l:ulclcne<l
by the birth of a liabc-thc convalc;:,cnce of the mother h d,:scrihctl in technical a111l comtly phru~c-" tlut the mother ii:; gPting 01t as well as coul,l
cxpcdc1l." It l111s hccn rc.scn·etl f,1r
)Ir. Scwar<l to embody this phra~c in a diplomatic ilc:;patch
with a degree of ob~tdric:d circmn:;tautiality which is very remarkable. Writiug to )tr. Adam~, on the 18th of .July, 18ti:.?,
(anol we beg the incredulous reader to verify our literal quotatiou,) he Hayil:
" .\.II the river,;. canal~. lake~. allf1 railrou ls before mcntionc,l,
arc free from olJstructions; Yiehb11rg is l•P~iege1l and rnm,t
soon fall, )fohilc autl Charleston will fall soon thereafter. 'l'he
work of pacification in the region conccrnc,l is going on as eucce,qs_full!J a1J coulcl be e.rpect1•d. Yon ht•ar of occasion:d guerilla
rai1l", but these arc only the after pungs of rPvolution in that
qu:Lrter which has pr1n-e<l an aiortion.''
It is the insen8ibility to •lccornm rnanift':;tc<l in so nasty :m
illustration that al'count:-; for what othcrwiso woul<l !Jc an inscrutnble pnzzle with ,•11 : 1cn of the lea-t ta,te, or cxperil'nce
in public affair,;, how a Sccretnry of State, who must necessarily
suffer from the recoil of hi-, own follies, coultl authorizl', still k,s
insti~ate the publication of muny of the confiflenti:il papers in tltis
volume. 'l'ho simple truth i8, that <litl not foreign :;tates111cn
regar,l, (as we hope they 1h) the Lincoln .A1lmini~tratio11, all(l
c~pccially Mr. Seward, as in cwry semo exceptional :in<l
irrc:1ponsihle, there is enough in this volume, its authorized publication being the offi•ncc, to cm broil us ,\ ith c,·cry nr. t:, ,n
bcyonJ the jagged ctlgc-; of what is left of the United State~.
Espt'eially is this the case with the power with whom jnst now
fril·wbhip seems mo~t precarious, the Emperor of tho French.
It is full of rcvcbtions not only of ~Ir. s\dams' priv:ite moYcments arnl conver~ation~ in relation to the French operntion,- in
~Icxico, an<l 11:s cx11ltiition at the disappointment,; wl1irh sccme<l
to attend them, b11t of an elaborate awl Rystematie, though
apparently incffcetnal, intrigue at )fodrid to 1lctach Spain from
its French connection~, all of which may have been right enough
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in themselves, but ought not, unless offence was intended or
foreign war desired-to have been authoritatively published.
There is enough in the foolish book to exclude i\Ir. Adams from
anything like unreserved social or official intercourse in London,
and we can imitgine Mr. Dayton's dismay and perplexity if Mr.
Drouyn de Lhuys, or the Emperor himself were to ask an explanation of the following passage from a Jespatch of i\Ir. Pike
at the Hague, now given to tho world unclcr the imprimatur of
our government.
"The movement in )foxico," he writes on the 28th ifay, "as
viewetl here, in well informed circles, is regarded as developing a
purpose on the part of tho Emperor to strengthen his prestige
aml his dynasty by coming forward as the supporter of the
church party in that couutry. Though not in favor with the
Catholics, he makes himself necessary to them in Rome, and
he seems to aim to occupy a similar position in Mexico. It is
undoubtedly in harmony with his plans to put money in the
pockets of influential supporters of the empire, by giving value
under a new regime to existing :Mexican securities in their possession which are at present worthless."
A more disparaging insinuation could not be made. The
same remark applies with cc1ual force to the exposure of the
kindred follies of l\Ir. Clay and )fr. i\Iotlcy, which, were there
any c;ense of propriety left at Washington, ought, instead of
being ostentatiously published, to be buried in the deepest
pigeon-hole of the department. The indiscretion extends every,, here-even where words of ciYility ,u-e used. l\Ir. De Stoeckel, than whom the diplomatic body can boast of no more
shrcw,l anil far-seeing member, ma(le so by his long residence
here and his thorough acquaintance with all our public men,
Ur. Seward included, is describe<l as a well-meaning indiYidual,
'' the excellent Russian Mini~ter," but too tender-hearted for
the crisis, and too apt-poor deluded man-to look at the ghastly
a'lpect of a war which irr. Seward elsewhere describes as not a
·' mild one." ~Ir. Bcrtinatti anil Baron Ricasoli leam from
this book that while, at one time, 1Ir. Seward is exuberant in
his love for their sovereign, and l\Ir. ~farsh boasts that " in no
part of the continent was the sympathy with the Government
of the union so strong and uniYersal as in Italy," meaning
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liberalized Italy, at another, Mr. Seward thanks Cardinal Antonelli for his especial sympathy. "The good wishes," says
he, "expressed by that statesman arc such as the Government
expected from him, and bis convictions that, in rejecting all
ideas of concession or compromise with our domestic enemies,
this Government is pursuing its proper and necessary policy,
are as creditable to his Eminence as they arc gratifyiug to the
United States."* Nor is this all. In July, 1>-161, in the midst
of the first Bull Run panic, as this volume admits, the Executive invited Garibaldi to take a high command, we believe a
Major-Generalship, in the Federal army. 'l'hc offer was declined for the reason that the policy of the administration was
not then sufficiently advanced in the direction of Abolition.
Mr. Seward now snys that it was made with the consent of the
King of Sardinia, which, if it be the fact, gives color to the
belief that as far back as the time we have indicated, that
government was quite willing to be rid of the adventurous and
troublesome chieftain, and transfer him to the Federal service

* Mr. Motley sees close parallels between )Ir. T,incolu's Government and that
of Ausirin. "The Grnnd Vizier," writes )fr. Morris, "exhibits a mirm sympathy ,i-ith the Union cause"-and the Viceroy of Egypt thinks that the war
should be prosecuted fiercely, and 'llis Highness,' says our Consul, ~Ir. 'J:hayer,
'is the son of ~fahomet-A Ii, and may spenk with hereditary Ruthority 011 questions of this kind.'" For fear our read,•rs may not estimate tho weight of
this Ruthority, we quote fro,n a cotempornry, a brief statement of )(abometAli's mode of conducting war vigorously:
".A horrible fate awaited those who had shut themselves up in the Palace;
they begged for quarter and surrendered, were immediiitely stripped nearly
naked, and 11,boutfifty were slaughtered ou the spot, and about the same number
were dragged away with enry brutal 11ggrantion of their pitiful condition
to ilobaromed Ali. Among them were four Beys, one of whom, dri ren to
madness by Mohammed Ali's mockery, asked for a drink of wMer; his hands
,vere untied, that he might take the bottle, but he snntcbcd a dagger from one
of the soldiers, and rushed at the Pasha, and fell, covered with wounds. The
wretched cavti ves were then chained, nnd left in the court oftbe Pasha's house;
and on the following morning the beads of their comrnues who had pel"ished
the day before, wero skinned and stu!rcd with straw, before their eyes. One
Iley and two others paid their ransom and were released; the rest, without c.i:ception, were tortured and put to death in the course of the ensuing night.
Eighty-three heads (many of them those of Frencb1uen and Albanitins) were
stuffed and sent to Constantinople, with a boast that the ,Iameluko chiefs wero
utterly destroyed. Thus ended )loburumed Ali's massacre of bis too confiding
enemies.''
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here. It was fortunate the invitation was dcclinecl, for soon
after, having taken the Archbishop of New York into his
confi<lcncc, ancl sent him as one of hii, Nuncios to Europe, ~Ir.
Seward had to extricate himself from his liberal entanglement.
The prelate coultl scarcely reconcile it 'With his paramount duty
at Rome, to be a fellow-labourer with one who, like Garibaldi,
bad denounced the Papacy as " the most wicked and loathsome
government in the world," and on another occasion hacl spoken
of it as "a hideous immoral monstrosity." Indcecl there is, in
this Yolumc, abumlant evidence that the Papal influence, love
for Cardinal .Antonelli and the Emperor of Austria, very early
triumphed in :Mr. Seward's heart over all liberal sympathy.
The Lincoln administration could indeed ill afford to quarrel with
the absolutists of Europe. But its agents abroad, the subordinate
ones at least, di<l not know this, and accordingly, we find that in
September, 1862, Mr. 'l'heoclore Canisius, our consul at Vienna,
following tho example set the year before at Antwerp, of his
own accord, renewed the imitation to Garibaldi. "1'he delight," said the simple-mindcJ. consul, "with which you would
be received in our country, would be immense, and your mission,
which would be to lead our brave soldiers to fight for the same
principles to which you haYC dcvote<l your life, would be fully
conformable to your intentions." ~'his time, unluckily, Garihaltli agreed to come, saying, that " so soon as his wounds were
healed he should be glad to satisfy his desire to serve the Great
American Republic, which is now fighting for universal liberty."
'l'hcy, the consul and the hero, little clrcamed of the change
which had in the interval come over l\Ir. Seward's spirit. Ile
was fi/,?hting no longer for liberty, but for absolute supremacy
an<l imperial authority. The absolutists were smiling on him.
The smile must be reficctcd. Early in October he ha<l received
Cardinal Antonelli's honicd words. About tho same time Mr.
l\Iotlcy wrote to him that the "entire sympathy" of Austria
was with the admini;,tration in its efforts to suppress, what the
historian of the Dutch Republic calls, "the mutiny of the
South." 'l'he Turks anrl Egyptians were i-ympathetic. Mr.
Burlingame thought the Tacpings "ere on the wane, and ~Ir.
Seward at once aml roughly recal1ct1 poor l\Ir. Canisius, telling
him that "at the present conjuncture, every care is necessarily
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to be taken to avoid injurious complications in foreign affairs;"
that what had been <lone was "entirely divergent from judicious policy," and that Garibaldi was neither more nor less than a
"rebel." This recall, thus derogatory alike to the unlucky consul, to Garibaldi, and, in view of what had occurred, to the writer,
Mr. Motley was directed to show to the Austri:in Prime Minister.
And this revelation of inconsistency, this insult to the liberal
spirit of the day, this confession of a grievous mistake, is put in
print as one of tho bright trophies of a statesman.*
The stupendous folly, and worse than folly, of the publication of this volume cannot, therefore, be too strongly statecl.
Should the normal condition of things at Washington ever be
resumed, it will, we trust, be a warning to all future Departments of State, and an admonition to reserve that will never be
forgotten. The mischief, we fear, is irreparable.
But wlrnt, let us ask, are the actual fruits of this paraded
diplomacy? Absolutely nothing-for we undertake, without
effort, to show,
1st. That there is no ground for the claim put forward by
Mr. Seward's friends, that he deserves credit for preventing
European mediation or intervention, for the simple reason that
no foreign power has ever, till lately, dreamed of mc<liating or
intervening, and then, when the attempt was indirectly made
hy :France, Mr. Seward knew nothing about it.
2d. That in the only matter in which he took the initiative
and pursued it-the effort to have the belligerent recognition
withdrawn-he absolutely failed, and why he failed.
3d. That it is a budget of blunders from first to last, and that

* ~rr. Seward's de~patchcs to China nrc "unique." For ex11mplc let 1he
render obsen·e the oddity of the following, dnted 22d April, ISG2: "'!'be solicitude you have suffered, and which was so houomble to your loyalty and patriotism, will ha,•e been rclie,·cd before thi, time by informntion tl:at wc huYe
g1·catly reduced, if not nltogNher nnrted, the dnuger of foreign wnr, nnd baYe
nt the snme time, obtained a very fair iirospctt of enrly domestic peace. In
Yiew of cil'il war raging in Greece ,u1d in Chinn, nnd of rising colllmotions in Italy,
Hungary and Germ,1ny, we may reasonably hope thnt Europe will become Jess
severe and censorious in regard to the unbnppy demonstrations of faction in
our heretofore trnnquil and uni1ed country.'' "His your duty,' snid he in another pince, "especially to lend no nid, encourngemeot or counten11nce to sedition or rebollion agninst imperial authority.'
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the blunders have been committed at the expense of his country's
traditionary principles.
Let us examine this sul;jcct briefly and fairly, following, as
far as possible, the easy order of time.
The diplomatic, like the fiscal year, under our system, is not
coincident with the old fashioned one of the calendar. Mr. Seward's year begins and ends in December. The close of 1861
was very dreary, and no American, be his political affinities
what they may, can think of it without a, Rhuddcr and a blush.
It was the era of the "Trent." Scarcely had the Secretary of
St:ite bundle!l up and put in the printer's hand, his volume of
first fruits of diplomacy, scarcely had he with the air of one
contented with laborious success, written to his favorite minister
(p. 27-1) that he now looked to sec less disposition abroad to treat
our flag with disrespect, when the .news broke on the American
public that Captain "'ilkcs ha<l forcibly taken from a British
steamer the Confederate commissioners, and brought them to
this country. So much has since occurred, so much blood has
been shed and agony endured, so sharp have been the spasms
of exultation and despair that have convulsed us in the progress
of this most wretched war, tlrnt it is not easy to recall distinctly
the panic-for such in truth it was-of the closing month of
1861, from the day the news of the capture came (Nov. 16)
to the day when it was known the surrender was decided on.
It is not worth while to reopen this question ; but looking hack
on it, as one can <lo with relative composure, there are one or
two points now apparent which were not so then, and there is,
it will be conceded, a settled judgment on the whole eYidcnce,
that but for the attitude taken by Great Britain, sustained as
it was by the unanimity of the world, the Federal administration would have evaded what they now pretend was a voluntary
act. In other words, that it was fear-reasonable enough-and
not the conviction of having done a wrong, or the recognition
of a principle, which induced the action of the Government.
This it is, and the recollection of a narrow escape from a foreign war, which causes the scandal and the blush. The ,rnrld
will never know the miserable secrets of office in that int.en'al.
The Secretary of State literally bid himself. On the 13th November, i\Ir. Russell, of the Times, then a prime favorite, was
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dining with M:r. Soward, who pleasantly told him that "tho English were the great smugglers who sustained tho rebellion."
On the 14th, there was another dinner with Mr. Soward, a
cheerful game of whist, and "~fr. Lincoln dropped in with a
new supply of west country jokes."* On the 16th came the
nows, and tho administration went into "Retreat." As late as
the 25th they were invisible; indeed it would seem they were
so till the end of the month. "I have neither so11ght nor
avoided an interview with Mr. Seward," wrote Lord Lyons,
"hut it has so happened, I have not seen him, nor, indeed, any
member of the Government, since the intelligence of the capture arrived." 1'hen came the l\Iessage, without a word on the
engrossing topic, and the Navy Department endorsement, and
the vote of the House of Representatives to throw the prisoners
into close confinement, and anxiety deepened; and so it continued, till the 18th of December, when "the messenger Seymour," arrived with the seven days ultimatum, and the ominous
freight of diplomatic urgency from every cabinet in Europe.
General Scott hurried home, confident of a war; for he did not
dream the prisoners would be given up without more of a struggle. Private letters flowed in, filled with alarms and counsel,
and, among them, one to the Secret.try himself, to which, in the
unravelling of this perplexity, sufficient attention has not been
paid, for it was the only one we know of, that suggested the
exact course which was adopted. 1'hose familiar with Mr. Seward's antecedents know his close affiliation to Irish politicians, their sympathies and antipathies. It is the basis of his
intimacy with the Arch-Episcopal incumbent of New York.
On the 2d of December, 1861, Mr. Smith O'Brien wrote a long
letter to his friend the Secretary of State, which must have been
received at Washington coincidently with Earl Russell's despatch, and which gave the clue for the dark labyrinth of rliffieulty-ofimpending danger, and threatened dishonour-in which
he was wandering. "Answer the British demands," wrote Mr.
O'Brien, "in the language of diplomacy. Quote authorities
and precedents to show that you aro justified by the Law of
Niitions, and especially by the example of England, in the seizure of these commissioners. Such discussions will give you
* Russell's "My Diary."
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time for deliberation an,l for preparation; but lose not an hour
in liberating the commissioners." 'l'his is exactly what :\Ir. Seward did, an(l thus, on the face of the evidence, it wouhl H'Cm
that to this Irish hint is clue the result at which the worlil rejoicctl ancl felt relie,·c<l, anil the nation blu:-:hc1l. It is a :-:acl
chapter, Yiew it as we may, an<l we gladly turn from it.
One effect, or rather consequence, of the 'rrent affair, was a
fit of comp:irati,,e silence on the part of the Secretary of State.
While, <luriug the rest of the year, the a,•erage of his cle~patches is nearly thirty a month, in January, 1862, he "Tote
lrnt ten, and those were brief and meagre. 'l'hc elasticity of
his $pirit seemed broken. ~fr. A1lams wrote to him OH the
10th, a111l the ilespatch, though acknowleilgccl, is suppressed.
Mr. Marsh f;poke of the "wisdom and skill" of the cabinet,
but cxtorte(l no answer, and again wrote Mr. Adams on tho
17th: "I nee.I not atl,l my testimony to the general tribute of
a1lmiration of the !,kilful manner in which the various diflicu.1tics and complications attending thii,; unfortunate busine8S have
been met allll avoide<l"-and Mr. Seward turned with gha~tly
1rnu:-:ea away from such praises. It was, however, while thus
abt-tinent from foreign correspondence, that he was e11~aged
actively at home, for, about this time, occurred the corre:;poudence with Ex-President I>ierce, as to which, no wortls of reprouation can be fouutl too strong. One reads it now, with absolute amazement that such a. violation of decency couhl ham
occurred, even here.
llut, with the lengthening days of February, Mr. Seward licg:m
to rally, aml in that month he wrote no less than twenty-one
de:-patche:-, the majority heing to Mr. Adam~, constituting the
opening chapter of his new arnl fruitless experiment~ to persmule the European powers to withdraw or modify their recognition of the Confederates as belligerents. It was cl1icfly directed to Greu t Britain. It began and continue<! in humiliation,
an<l ended, as we luwe Emid, in disappointment.
Before proceeding brielly to COll!-icler this r;acl story of diplomatic bw1gli11g, it i,; due to historical truth to i-ay, that while
~fr. Seward directed his energies-if such they can be termed
-mainly to influence the British cabinet, he never seellls to
have done justice, or to have fairly ei;timatecl, what these and
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later revelations show was the fair and friendly action of the
French Emperor. To England, as we will show, he was prepared to make any concession-to France, he was, if not churlish and discomtcous, silent and suspicious. Lord Russell (in the
true spirit of the Whigs) never was at heart very friendly to us.
Tho spirit of Abolitionism-at this moment as acrid as ever in
a certain, but, we hope, limited class of Englishmen-alone kept
in check tho adverse policy of a portion of tho ministry. It was
" the willing to wound an<l yet afraid to strike" policy throughout. It tried to please all sides in a surly fashion. i\Ir. Gladstone said one thing here, and Sir George Lewis another thing
there. They refused to recall ~Ir. Bunch from Charleston, and
yet they never actually demanded the release of a prisoner from
the bastiles. The Russell policy to America was a companion
to what had been doing in Prussia and Denmark, in Greece and
Rome.
And yet, to this government, Mr Seward was never wearied
of making surrenders. Let us sec what and how fruitless they
were. The memory of some of them i.s fading away, and ought
to he revived.
On the 4th January, 1862, Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Adams,
transmitting the copy of an unofficial letter he had sent to Lord
Lyons, together with one which, "amid the intensest heat of the
late excitement," he h,td addressed to the Governor of Maine.
This is the only reference we find to what is, in our estimation,
one of the most remarkable of 11r. Seward's many freaks-his
offer of a transit to the British reinforcements for Canada over
the territory of the State of i\faine. 'l'he Trent affair was, as
we have seen, only partially settled on the 2Gth of December. That is, the surrontlcr of the prisoners was agreed to, hut
no one can read Lord Lyons' despatch of that day without seeing that he had grave doubts whether the apology would be
deemed sufficient. It proved to be so, but Mr. Seward did not
know it till nearly a month later. He was right, therefore, in
speaking of the excitement as still continuing. On the 4th
January, news reached Wa,shington that a large detachment of
British troops, intended to garrison our frontier, was about to
arrfrc in the steamer "Bohemian." These troops were intended,
in case of probable difficulty, to fight us. They were to be
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scattered, with others, throughout the long line of forts from
Quebec to Ma.lden; and the artillery which accompanied them
was to be pointed at Ogdensburg, or Lewistown, or Buffalo, or
Detroit. They were, in no sense, soldiers crossing a neutral
territory, for which consent, when asked, is sometimes given.
It was not like the transit from Alexandria to Suez, during the
India mutiny. They were sent to Canada in possible hostility
to us. And yet the Secretary of State thought it right, unsolicited, and without consulting the local authorities, to send orders to the marshal and other Federal officers at Portland to
give "the agents of the British Government all proper facilities
for landing or carrying to Canada, or elsewhere, all troops or
munitions of war, of every kind without exception." One reads
such an order now with wonder a,nd incrcduli ty. N eccl any one
be surprised that the authorities of the State of l\Iaine were
startled, and remonstrated, and that, too, when the invading
troops did not come, or that they claimed some right over their
own soil and their own highways? What would have been
thought twenty, or ten, or five ye:1rs itgo, in our normal condition, had a Secretary of State, or President sent an order for
foreign soldiers, with all the accomplishments of war-" munitions without exception"-artillery and baggage wagons-caissons and ambulances to pass through the borders of a State?
Let it be supposed that the point to be reinforced was Windsor
or Sandwich, opposite Detroit, to which the shortest line of approach is from N cw York or Philadelphia ; does any sane man
imagine that at either of those cities, British troops could be
safely landed, to be carried over our railways, "with munitions
of war of every kind, without exception," especially when it
was known and admitted thitt the object of these very reinforcements was war on our borders and against us? Neither Secretary of State, nor President of the United States has any
right, or pretence of right, to put a foreign soldier on the soil
of any State, and no one knows this better than i\fr. Seward.
But, in bis haste to propitiate Great Britain, he forgot it all,
and, like every other humiliation to which he subjected himself
and his country, it was fruitless; for we search in vain through
his own despatches, the parliamentary Blue Books, and tho
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newspapers, for any kind word which this act of gratuitous submission extorted.
This was humiliation in the germ. Let us go on to its blushing flowers and bitter fruits.
The Slave Trade Treaty was the next voluntary sacrifice, and
as to this, scarcely one word is to be found in the volume of
which l\Ir. Seward is so prou<l. It deserves a distinct consideration.
1'here were once-when we had a country and a namf)-two
traditionary principles closely cherished in the hearts of the
American people: the absolute sanctity of the flag, with a denial
of the right of police search on the ocean, and the :Monroe Doctrine. We now think of them as of the dead. When in life
and vigour-and especially is this true of the second-they were
troublesome and sometimes inconvenient, but they had their
root in a high national spirit, and they expressed a sense of
national power. The fatuity of Mr. Lincoln's Government has
sacrificed them both; the Monroe Doctrine perhaps from necessity, but the sanctity of the flag, as we can demonstrate, voluntarily, fruitlessly, and, as we think, shamefully. Mr. Seward
may think nothing of it, but this reversal of history, tl1is renunciation of ancient policy, gives a F-harp pang. It is a companion
shame to the Trent surrender, without the duress. When, fortyfive years ago, l\Ir. Wilberforce hinted such a thing in a qualified form to l\Ir. J. Q. Adams, the reply was, "l\Iy countrymen
will never assent to such an arrangement." When, six years
later, Mr. Rush signed a convention to this effect with Sir
Stratford Canning and i.\Ir. Iluskisson, the Senate amended it
so as to prevent its appliciition to the American coasts, and
then it was rejected by England. General Jackson, in 1834,
directed his Secretary of State to say to Sir Charles Vaughan
that "the United States were resolved never to become a party
to any convention on this subject;" and this, said Mr. Benton,
speaking of it, years afterwards, was "the true American answer." It was l\Ir. Cass's diplomatic triumph in Franco to
prevent this interpolation into the law of nations in 1841. i\Ir.
Webster refused to recognize it in his negotiations with Lord
Ashburton, as did l\Ir. Stevenson and :\Ir. Everett with Lord
Aberdeen, even in its new disguise of" visitation." "Without
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intending," said Mr. Webster in one of his grnvest depatchcs
to General Cass, "or desiring to influence the policy of other
governments on this important subject, this Government has
reflected on what was due to its own character and position, as
the leading maritime power on the American continent, left free
to make choice of such means for tho fulfilment of its duties
as it should deem best suited to its dignity. The result of
its reflections has been that it docs not concur in measures
which, for whatever benevolent purpose they may be adopted,
or with whatever care or moderation they may be exercised,
have a tendency to place tho police of the seas in the hands of
a single Power." As recently as 1858, for the continuity of
precedents is perfect, President Buchanan said with emphasis,
" The occasional abuse of the flag is an evil far less to be deprecatcd than would be the establishment of any regulations
incompatible with tho freedom of tho seas." "I don' t want
any negotiations," said Mr. Crittenden in the Senato, "with
GrcRt Britain, or any lliscussion with Great Britain, about the
right of search or right of visitation. That is a subject which
is exhausted, for our minds arc made up about it. I should
think it unworthy of this Government to enter into any negotiation on the subject." "Without referring," said Mr. Dallas
in London, " to this question more closely, it is a point which is
essentially conneete(l with one of the fundamental principles of
the American Revolution, that principle being the necessity of
maintaining on behalf of the great American people, as a great
community, the indepcnc1cncc of their flag. I am not now going
to argue this question as to visit and search, but I should like,
on the Fourth of July, to announce to my fellow-countrymen,
that visit and search, in regard to American yesscls in time
of peace, is finally cndccl." "We have never," said Senator
Seward, on the 29th of May, 1858, four short years ago, "We
have never recognized this pretension of Great Britain, and we
nevei· will. Therefore, it is that, for twenty years past, I have
never looked into a law book to ascertain the law in regard to
this subject. It is enough tha,t the claim cannot be permitted.
It is enough that it would destroy the equality of nations. It
is enough that it is a claim on the part of another power to
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exercise vigilance and supervision oYcr the conduct of this
nation."*
Great must luwo been Lord Lyons' delight anrl surprise when,
if this record tells the whole story, on the 22d of March, l\Ir.
Seward, in hot haste, wrote to him, offering to surrenrler everything-traditions, prejudice, associations, history, everythingin onler to put down a trncle which, according to his own showing, neither Americans, nor English had any pnrt in, and telling him that, if the sugge)<tion were agreeable, he had the project of a Convention ready for signature. Lord Lyons has
said that he was never more astonished in bis lifo. He did not,
and could not, hesitate. 'l'he diplomatic fruit at which every
Il1·iti)<h statesman-eYery :Minister in this country, from Sir
Au~ustus Foster downwards-had been stretching out his hand,
and looking anxiously, fell at his feet, Mr. Seward shaking the
tree. On the same day, (22il,) Lonl Lyons agreed to it. Before
the 28th, the Convention was revised and 1'eacly for signature,
for, we find on that day n, further experiment was made on Mr.
Sow:trd's facility in a suggestion to make the treaty perpelnal;
an1l, on the 7th April, the whole ge~tation being a fortnight, a
compact was macle for ten years, by which an unlimited right
of police search within liberal geographical limits was grnntocl
to English cruisers, aml mixed judicial commissions were instituted on the coast of Africa, ancl in the city of N cw York. It
was ratified, of course, by the Abolitionizecl Senate, and is now
the law of this part of tho land. For his shnre in it, Lord
Lyons received, what, no doubt, he is on every account well
entitled to, the honour of the Grand Cross of the Bath. lf the
venerable statesman who, in 182-!, signed a treaty of this kind
with :Mr. Rush, and who still survives, ever turns his mincl from
the Orient to the Occidental world, (occidental, we fear, in
every sense,) he may be excused for wonder at the miraculous
decay in American statesmen, of that fierce, obl:itructive, chivalrous spirit which once snuffed danger to national honour in any
breeze that affected our flag on tho ocean.
Since 18-!2, says i\Ir. Seward, but one American vessel (the
Wanderer) has ever landed an African on our soil. In :March,
18G2, (p. 45) he boasted that the blockade of the Southern

* Lawrence oc the Right of Visit aud Search, pages 94-117.
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coasts was as effective ns the worl<l had e,c-r known. Slaves
certainly coul«l not be landed th('n. The emancipation policy
was germinating, which, if succes:,;ful, according to the theory
of its authors and advoeates, wonhl put an C'tHl to sl:wery, an<l
of course the :-lave trade. The Coni;titution of the Confoilcrate
States, (a Htrcr guaranty than any treaty that could be patehctl
up :it ,Yashington,) prohibited the tr ade.* 'l'here was 110 conceivable in,lucemcnt at that time to make an anti-slave trade
compact, unless one is to be found, (and this is our theory,) in
the willingnc:-;s to propitiate the anti-slavery party of Great
llritain, aJHl seduce Loril Palmerston's Government into a retraction of the belligerent re-cognition of the South. We challenge
the detection of any other. We shall presently see how fruitless, how pcrniciou,-, aml, in the e:-timate of other nations, how
cliscreditahle it was.
Fruitlt•~~ it certainly was, if the end proposed was a change
in the policJ of Great Britain. This volmne, in which, hy-thehyc-, there ii- a significant silence ns to the Seward sunen,leri-,
shows thnt not a feature of the Russell countenance towards
North and South relax eel, eYen at this sacrifh:e. The Earl was,
if pos~iblc, stl'rner atHl more captious than before. With others
in Great Britain, tho~e wc mean of a different party, the Oppoi;ition, whor-e possible accession to power ti cautious diplomatist
should always consider. the effect of this humiliation was positi,cly evil. "The quarrel between North and South," says a.
leading organ of the 1'ory party, "has given us an oppot·tunity
which has heen used of putting an end to wluit was left of the
Slave trade. The dominant party of the North has not been ,:orry
to gain credit cheaply for a. certnin degree of sincerity in its
alnu;e of slavery. '!'he Stars and Stripes cannot again, if we
i-how ourselves dispo8e<l to enforce the treaty obligations into
which )Ir. Lincoln ha~ entered, enn at the COtit of war, be u5ed
to cover thi:,; traffic. It i:,; not to lie supposed, we should recogni'4e tht) Confederate States without exacting that they 1,houltl
hol,l thcml-\elvcs boun<l 1,y the spirit of the old compact between
Englan,l awl the Cuion of which they formed a part; nn<l it

* See ~Ir. IlcnjRmin's intercepted letter on this subject, where the rcl11Lioos of
the Confollerntc ~tates nro llclincd.

33
will certainly be the duty of the GovC'rnment to obtain such
guarantees as, without infringing the in1lc•pendcnce or aflronting
the jealous susceptibilities of the Southern people, will make it
impos~ilJle tlrnt the Confederate flag, the flag which Lee, ano.
Beauregard, and Stonewall Jachon haYe taught us to honourshall ever be di:;gr.acetl, n,s the Federal colours so oftm were,
by floating from the mast of a slaver. There will be no difficulty in obtaining such a treaty. The Confodcrates have not
the slightest desire to r evive the slave trnde; their Constitution,
their State laws, and the iutcrei-ts of their ruling cla:,,-, as well
as the F<trong opinion of the country, arc again,:,t it. And they
cannot conceive that their dignity would be compromi~cd by
doing what France, and Spain, the "Gnited St:1tcs and Brazil,
have voluntarily clone. There will be no difliculty, then, in
making this war the means of ensuring the final extinction of
the slaYe trade. Indeed, when the Korth was forced to abandon
it, it was virtually destroyed."*
'l'his is poor consolation for ~Ir. Seward's renunciation of
ancient principles.
Dangerous, practically, this treaty has been, or may prove
to be. By one of its provisions the police supervision of Great
Britain is extenrled to a distance of thirty leagues, not from
certain portions, but from the whole coast of Cuba. Now,
waiving the apparent inrlecornm of defining the extent of such
a concession 1,y measurement from the limits of a friendly,
though jealous power, it is apparent that a line of thirty leagues
from I>oint Yeacos or :\fotanzas would touch the Floritla Kep,
so that our coast, supposing it still to lw ourR, and narrow seas,
are placed under this annoying surveillance. No other independent power on earth, not enm Hayti, e,er made such a conccssion, t antl this, too, at a moment, when, in view of poRsible
contingencies, it is the obvious policy of the Nor them Gornrnment to remove a~ far away as possible the naval forces of European powers, who, though to-1lay neutrals, may to-morrow
become belligerents. In a letter from the British Charge
cl'.A.ffaires of l:-eptembcr 13, 186~, is a furmidahlc list of "Iler
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Majesty's ships employed in the suppression of the slave trade
iit North America and the West In11ies," comprising two lino-ofbattlc ships, (an odd craft for such a service,) four frigates, four
corvettes, and eleYen gun-boats, with an aggregate armament of
485 guns, twice as many as are appropriated to the whole continent
of Africa, from Sierra Leone to the mouth of the Red Sea. Of
course, the presence of such squadrons, however discreetly managed, leads to trouble. This volume contains more than one
complaint of "unreasonable searches and seiz.ures" (p. 284)
under this very treaty, and the old story of harsh conduct to
our "innocent merchantmen" begins to fill our newspapers.*
If thus fruitless, and with this germ of posi;iblc mischief, can
such a compact be otherwise than discreditable in the estimation of foreign nations, and especially of that one great Power
who, on this 11uestion of the freedom of the seas, has stoocl firmly
by us? On this topic, the volume is painfully silent, and if the
French Government uttered or intimated sorrow, or dissent, or
reproach, it has been suppressc<l. 'l'hc Spani:-;h authorities were
not so reticent, for \IC fin<l in it despatch from Mr. Perry, at
:Madrid, (p. 509,) the following curious statement of what that
Government thought, which we quote at length :
"At a recent interview with i\Ir. Calderon Collantes, that
" minister enquired if l had received a copy of the trcn.ty re,, cently concluded between tho United States and England,
'· concerning the mutual right of search, for the suppression of
" the African slave trade. He was much surprised that after
" combatting that principle so long, the United States should
" have yielded now a right so exceedingly liable to be abused
" in practice, and ho was very curious to know what provi:,ions
" httd been stipulated to guard the exercise of the right from
" such abuse. I replied, regretting I could give no information
'' other than what Mr. Calderon had himself seen in the news" papers. I understood, however, that the stoppage of the use
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The cnse of the" ~lorning Star," reported in the Evening l:'ost of January
I Gth, 1863. In August 111st, Mr. Stuart, the British Obnrgc, informed Mr.
Seward that Her .\Iajesty's shi1, Griffin bad captured nnd burn.;d off Lonndo
no American b11rque, fitted for the slnyc trnde, and bd,moing lo liew York.
'l'he letter wus nckn9wlcdged by Mr. Scw,ird, who oddly enough said, I
thnok you for the information thus coruwunicated, 1c!ticlt i8 in eve1-y 1·espect entirely acceptable and gratifyinv.

I

J

35
" of the American flag in the slave trade was an object which
" would naturally commend itself to the favor of the present
" Government of the United States, and I en'luircd if Spain
"had not herself conceded the same right. Mr. Caltlcron said
" that she had, at a period in her history which could not be
" recalled with pl~sure, but that, ever since he himself had held
" the portfolio of foreign affairs, he had been desirous of an op" JJOrtunity to revise that whole treaty, in which the right of
" search was thus granted to Great Ilritain. The exercise of
" this right was vexatious, and besides, tho English were always
"talking, in Parliament and out, of their having purchased this
"right of Spain for £40,000, * sterling money, always putting
" their money forward, and ho (Mr. Calderon) would be exceed" ingly glad of an opportunity to give them their £40,000, and
" have the treaty back again. Mr. Calderon asked me if I sup" posed the recent treaty would be ratified by the American
" Senate. I replied to him that I had no reasonable doubt that
" it would be, and remarked that I supposed that England
" was now taking steps to obtain the same concession from
"the Government of l?rancc. Mr. Calderon said he had little
" doubt of it, but he wi:;hcd to sec the American treaty, ns it
" might afford tt basis for demanding a revision of the Spanish
"treaty, as to the manner in which this right was to be exer" cised. '.l'hough perhaps this conversation was not intencled
" by l\Ir. Calderon to be reported to you, I have thougl1t it
" interc:;ting."
This seems, naturnlly enough, to have irritated Mr. Seward,
for, on the 2d August, he thus pettishly retorts, giving a fling
at the Spanish authorities, which was neither discreet nor
dignified.
"Your despatch of July 11 (No. GO), has been receiYed.
" The African slave trade, which has been so long clandestinely
" carried on from American ports, was a mercenary traffic,
" without even the poor pretext that it brought labourers into
" our country, or that other or worse pretext, that~ was neccs" sary to the safety or prosperity of any State or section. It
" was carried on in defiance of our laws, by corrupting the ad-

* So printed in these
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ministration of justice. Tho treaty to which you refer contaim; no provibions that can embanass an honest and lawful
trade, and none that can inflict a wound upon the national
pride. It was freely offere!l by this Government to Great
Britain, not bougltt, or solicited by that Government. It is
in harmony with the sentiments of tho American people. It
was ratified by tho Senate unanimously, and afterward distinctly approved, with not less unanimity, by both Houses of
Congress. Not a voice has been raised against it in the country. I send you a copy of it for Mr. Calderon, as you have
reqnested."
Thus, then, has Mr. Seward, without npparent compensation,
boun!l all that is left of this N orthorn nation in chains, from
which there is no peaceful escape. That there is not a secret
history in this inexplicable trnnsaction, an understanding of
future sympnthy and co-operation between the contra,cting
parties, the Lincoln and Russell Governments, in case their
tenure of power is prolonged, we arc far from affirming. The
suspicion, the fear, tho hope-describe it as we may-that this
sacrifice is not made in niin, and that tho English administration may find it to be its interest to make this a substantial contract, by giving strength to the party who voluntarily tenderetl it,
has more than once come like a dark shadow over us. An antislave-trade treaty with the North alone, would be tho idlest of
forms, except on tho theory that, as heretofore, all the slave
trading is to be carried on with Northern ca,pital and in Northern bottoms. Then, it may be of value, even if the Southern
Confederacy be cstablisl1od. Otherwise, it is, as we have said,
utterly fruitlci;s. Fruitless, we have it shown to be as to immediate results.
lt was in this same month of March, that the administration
ass em bled ancl brought in to action all its diplomatic array abroad,
regular and irregular. Not only wero l\Ir. W cod and the Bishops
on the spot, but, as this ,·olume shows, other combinations were
initiated.
1'he conYocation of this new diplomatic Congress, was formally announced to our ministers abroad, who a,p pear to have
been confounded by tho news. "When in November last,"
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said Mr. Seward, "wo thought we had reason to apprehend
new and very serious dangers in Europe, the subject was taken
into consideration by the President at a full meeting of the cabinet. It was understood that the insurgents were represented
abroad, by a number of active, unscrupulous, and phtusible men
who manifestly were acquiring influence in society, and in the
press, and employing it with dangerous effect, and it was
thought that such efforts could be profitably counteracted by tho
presence in London and Paris of some loyal, high-spirited, and
intellectual men, of social position and character. We considered that the presence of such persons there, unless they should
act with 11w1·e discretion than we could confidently expect, would
annoy, and possibly embarrass, our ministers abroad. It was
decided that hazard must be incurred in view of dangers which
seemed imminent."
A bettor reason for not sending these semi-official agents
abroad could hardly be given than in the lines we haYe ventured
to italicise. So thought :i\Ir. Ad,uns, for we search this book in
vain for any expression, on his p.irt, of gratitude for tho suggestion. Who the new agents were, does not appear in these
despatches, though aliunde, we know all about them. The
Bishops and Mr. Weed hurried to the rescue. The latter,
the accredited friend, the almost partner of the Secretary of
State, was received in England with great friendliness and apparent unreservc. IIe was the guest of Lady Russell, at Richmond Park, and duly wrote home letters, to be printed in the
Albany E\·cning Journal, full of local gossip picked up in
her drawing-room, and criticising tho details of he: household. Occasionally, his services were needed on a more public stage. Bishop Mcilvaine, who seems to have been in the
service of the administration from the time of his visit to
England, until the adjournment of the trionni:il Convention in
October, 1862, always active, meddlesome, intrusive, sometimes
needed the assistance of his lay colleague, and we find that Mr.
W cod, the conservative of 18G3, was not far behind the most
extreme anti-slavery propagandists, in the spring of 18G2.
On the 3d February, 1862, Mr. W oed addressed a meet-
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in~ at No. 2 Pall, :Mall, and, among other things, said:
'' As to the prospects of the future, the administration not only
desired, but expected emnncipation as tho fruit and result of
the war. Slavery was arnl woultl be burned out of every acre
arnl rood of territory conquered from the rebels ; so that, by
process of war and by leg:tl enactment, if the United St.itcs
Government were successful, slavery woultl cease to exist."*
Not content ";th :Mr. Weccl .and the Prelates, :.\Ir. Seward
summonoll Mr. Motley, from Vienna to London, to confer aml cooperate with Mr. Aclams.
And here, let us pause over another wreck of reputation
which is seen through the haze of this official correspondence. Mr.
John Lothrop Motl<'y-not, as he tells us, the Emperor of Austria
imagined (p. 557), "a German exile," but "a descendant of the
early Pilgrims of New England," had, before he was tempted
into diplomatic p,iths, a l1igh position in American authorship.
Justly or unjustly, he luul gained a large share of favour on
both sides of the Atlantic, and when his appointment to Austria
was announced, those who were willing to judge :i.\Ir. Seward
kindly were content to see 11 parallel to the case of Washington
Irving, whom Mr. W cbster sent as Minister to Spain years ago,
aml whoso official action, while it involved no neglect of public
interests or duties, was improved by labour in tho Cttuse of letters, far dearer to him than politics. But "the descendant of
the early Pilgrims" could not, anu, we arc bound to say, docs
not seem to have tried to, repress tho inherited and inherent fanaticism which seems to be interwoven with the heart-strings of N cw
Englanc.1. Before he was appointct1, he wrote an essay for the
London Times on the Constitution, of which it was justly said by
an able critic : " 'l'hat its melodramatic style prevails widely in
tho American press, and is well adapted to the condition to
which it has reduced the American mind ; showing, as it docs,
how words may be made effective in clouding the m incl, and how

* London R~cord, FohruRry 3 : To curions contrast with this lrn.ra.ngue are
Yr. Weed's pr11inodes of 1863. " If," sa.id he, "the ~\Orth rejected abolition as
a merely political test, will it be accepted now, when the lives of our sons and
brothers, nnd the preservation of the country nre involved I We ask this ques.
tion now in vio,v of the concerted effort to narrow this mighty struggle for
national existence down to an abolition crusade."
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sentiments may be boldly set side by side with facts which utterly
belie them."* 'fhough startled by thii!, we were not prepared
for such revelations of puerility and what we are tempted to
call 'snobbishness' disclosed in tho half-dozen despatches from
Vienna which Mr. Seward has cruelly given to the world. We
have neither room nor patience to consider them in detail, but
beg the reader, who may, naturally enough, in view of l\ir.
Motley's reputation, doubt the severe justice of our judgment,
to examine for himself the despatch of November, 18Gl, narrating his reception by the Emperor, and the concluding one of
October, 1862, in which, with a poor garniture of familiar quotations, and a dismal continuity of platitudes, he discusses the
position and character of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer,
with whom, one would think, the Minister to Austria has no more
concern than with the Rajah of Sarawak, and to whose speech at
Manchester he applies the gentle and gentlemanly criticism:
"Blistere,l be the tongue that speaks of shame is the only and
fit response to such rhetoric and such prophecy as Mr. Gladstone's.''
Why, with such antecedents, and circumstances, ~Ir. Motley
was selected to go to London to help Mr. Adams would be a
puzzle hut for his assertion of his own fitness for the work. Ile
is tho "i\Ir. Lofty" of this diplomatic comedy. "I told Count
Rechberg that I had recently had a very long and full conversation with Lord John Russell, &c." "I told him I had received
similar assurances from other members of the English cabinet,
&c." " He asked me what I thought of the attitude of France,
arn1 I told him that nI. Thouvenel had assured me, &c. ;" and
at last he winds up with a passage which we reproduce, as being
as concentrated a specimen of egotism and official indiscretion
as this YOlume contains.
"One thiug is vory certain. The Government here will be
" very much influenced by the course of policy pursue<l. towards
'' tho U nitcd States by the British and French governments;
" and I am thoreforo glad that, in pursuance of your instruc-

* The Constitution and Mr. i\Iotley, by Rowland E. Evans Esq., of the
Philadelphia Bar. Pbiladelphia, 1861.
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" tions, I passed some time before coming to my post informing
" myself at the fountain heads, in England and France, of the
" probable nature of that policy. I am con:,tantly questioned
" on the subject by all with whom I come in contact. Should
" a tory government succeed the present cabinet in England, I
" anticipate much trouble. Nothing can exceed the virulence
" with which the extreme conservative party regard us, nor the
" delight with which they look forward to our extinction as a
" nation. They consider such a consummation of our civil war
" as the most triumphant answer which could be made to their
" own reform party. The hatred to the English radicals is the
" secret of the ferocity and brutality with which the Times, the
" Satunlay Review, and other tory organs of the press have
" poured out their in:,ults upon America ever since the war
" began. In the present administration and its supporters, I
" know we have many warm friends, wanner in their senti" ments towards us, than it would be safe for them, in the pre"sent state of parties, to avow."
'What, we may diffhlently ask, will be thought of the propriety
and expediency of puhlishing such a despatch as this, if, by any
political accident, Lord Derby and "the extreme conservative
party" should come into power?
'Whether l\Ir. Motley llid bring to l\Ir. Adams' aid his familiar
acquaintance with the leaders of British politics, does not appear very clearly, but whether he did or not, no result was attained. The aggregated influence of prelates and politicians in
London availed naught. 'l'he ministry refused to recede a hair's
breadth from their recognition of the belligerent rights of
the South. The Alabama and Orcto, and that una<ljmlicate<l
craft, the Bermuda, sailed from Liverpool, destined for destructive war on Northern commerce. Strict port discipline
watched the Tuscarora at Southampton, and a British frigate
literally convoyed the Nashville to sea. The poor little
Saginaw was ordered away from IIong Kong.* The Emily

* In April Inst, ~Ir. Seward wrote to Mr. Adams as to the "Chinese" Rebellion, n special despatcb, which it would be unfail' to suppress or mutilate. Its
oddity, in view of e1·erything at home and abroad, is superlatil·c. "'l'hc re-

f
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St. Pierro was not gi\·cn up. The Bull Dog (p. 228) carried
"one Pegram and seYen other persons" to officer "290." In
short, at the end of Mr. Seward's year, the curtain dropped
on a scene of impotent diplomacy, which all his rhetoric cannot
di,\guise. Mediation or intervention never was dreamed of in
England; and the belligerent recognition, for tho withdrawal
of which there was so much fruitless urgency, remains in as full
force as on tho day it was announced. '' How far," said l\fr.
Adams, in one of his la.test letters, '' tho question of a recognition of the insurgents will enter into the deliberation (of Parliament), I will not venture to 1wedict. My opinion is that that
event now depends almost entirely on the fortune of tho war.
If we prove ourselves, by February next, no more able to control its results than we are at this moment, it will be difficult for
ministers longer to resist the current of sentiment leading in that
direction in both Houses of Parliament. Even the unpleasant
alternative of appearing to uphold slavery against tho action of
the Government will be acquiesced in as an overruling necessity,
dictated by the popular opinion. I feel it my duty to say this
ports we receive from Chinn show th!tt the insurrection there is becoming very
formidable, and they leave it doubtful whether the British and French forces
now in Chinn are adequate to secure the iuviolnbility of the persons and pl'Opcrty of the subjects and citizeos of the wcsteru powers dwelling in the commercial cities of that Empire. It is a matter of deep regret to us that om· troubles at home render it hazardous to withdraw a part of our great land nnd naval forces from operating here, o.nd send them to China t-0 co-operate with the
forces of the allies there. As you arc well aware, the continuance of the insurrection in the United States is due to the attitudes of Great Britain and
France towards our couutry. It would seem to be desirable for those two states
to have our co-opemtion in Cbiua in preserving a commerce of vast importance
to them as well as to ourseh'es. 'l'hat co-operation we could gi l'O if we were
relieved from the necessity for maintaining a blockade and seige of the Southern
ports. Moreover, the question may bo well asked, where is this tendency to
insurrection, which Great Brituin and France seem to ns to be practically, although unintentionally, fostering, to end? It breaks out in the Levant; it grows
flagrant on the Chinn coasts; it el'en lifts up its head iu France. Is iL not the
interest of all great maritime states to repress or at least to discourage it? The
President does not expect you to make any special or formal suggestion of these
views to the British GoYernment, but it seems to him you may properly use
them, incidentally, with advantage to your intercourse with the British Government and British society."
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much, in order to prevent tho smallest misconception of the existing state of things, on this side, in the minds of tho Government itt home."
If to be forewarned is to be forearmed, then, in the beginning
of November, when this ominous despatch reached America, was
the administration at Washington clad in proof; yet on the
10th of the same month, General McClellan was removed from
his command and banished to the mild sympathies of N cw York
and Boston, and the chapter of disaster opened, which seems
to have closed, in bloody disappointment, on the heights of
Fredericksburg, at Vicksburg, and in the doubtful struggle at
:Murfrcesborough.
Turning to Mr. Seward's diplomacy in Paris, let us briefly
and candidly state its course and its fruits. As tending to
something like a result at tho moment these lines are written,
they arc very important. In it, one thing is very manifest,
that Mr. Dayton never enjoyed the same confidential and cordial
relations to the Government at home as did Mr. Adams, or Mr.
Motley, or even Mr. Pike, of the Tribune; and this, for no other
apparent reason than, that a year ago, in the matter of the surrender of privateering, Mr. Dayton had proved not only that
he had a will of his own, but that, when he yioldcu it to positive
orders, ho was right and the Government wrong.* There can

* The threat which, in July, 1862, was made towards England, in Febrn11ry
1863, is about to be aimed somewhere else. On the l 7th instant, as these sheets
are passiug through the press, the Senate Bill authorizing privateers was dug
from its forgotten grave and animated. It was pnsscd in spite of the opposition
of the Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs. No comment is needed
on the following proceedings:
"Ma. 1IoDoooALL ~aid he especially wanted this bill passed, for be believed
that before Congress met again, we should ho at war with a foreign power, and
should need all our force 011 sea and land.
"Ma. SUMNER offered an amendment confining tho operation of the bill to the
suppression of the rebellion. He argued that we should not put anything in
the bill like a menace. When we were engaged in a foreign war, then would
be time enough to meet that question.
"Ma. McDouoAtL Mked the Senator, as Chnirmnn of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, if wo were not now threatened with foreign complications.
"Ma. Sc;Mi-i,;a said he had no information that was not open to the Senn.le.
" Ma. )lcDouOALL believed that before the meeting of anothc1· Congress we
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hardly be conceived a position of greater embarrassment for an
intelligent, patriotic and high spirited man, than thttt of Mr.
Dayton, during the anxious and busy year just ended. Accredited to a court whose master prides himself on his demeanour
• of reserve, if not his policy of subtlety; opposell by what, abroad,
is a vast power, social sympathy antl antipathy; confronted by
an able, astute, and, in his line of diplomacy, accomplished adversary; unfamilia.r with the language :if the refined and artificial society in which he was plunged; Mr. Dayton had, at least,
a right to a thorough and cordial support at home, and to something more than a chilling and formal endorsement of his conduct. Mr. Seward was never wearied of sending honied compliments to Mr. .Adams as to his ability, his sagacity, his discretion, his "far-reaching grasp" (p. 201). To his colleague
in France he was far more sparing.
But Mr. Dayton laboured under another disadvantage which
was radical. Representing a jealous, suspicious, irritable Government, impregnated thoroughly with the one idea of unity at
any cost, and coercion to an illimitable extent-a Government
which, whether right or wrong at the beginning, has learned
nothing and forgotten nothing, and resents any different view
of tho circumstances which surround it, it was difficult, if not
impossible, especially with the meagre information furnished
him, to rise to the appreciation of fair play and really friendly
should be involved in a foreign wnr, nnd he wanted to have the country prepared.
"Tho amendment of Mr. Sumner was rejected-yens 13, nays 22.
"Ma. SuMNER offered an amendment as n substitute, re,·iving the acts of 1812
and 18131 concerning the letters of marque, and applyiqg them to that portion
of tb~ United States in insurrection. Rejected.
")ln. SUMNER offered another amendment, as a substitute, authorizing the
Secretary of the Navy to hire any vessels needed ior the national service, putting them in charge of officers commissioned by the United States, and giving
them the character of national ships. Rejected-yeas 8, nays 28.
"Ma. D,1.ns, of Kentucky, offered a substitute, authorizing the President to
pay any vessel regularly put into commission three times the value of any ship
01· ships captured belonging to the Stales now in insurrection. Rejected."
The bill was then passed-yeas 27, nays 9-no Democratic Senator voting.
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feeling on the part of the Government to which he was accredited. Y ct such has been the conduct and temper-as the
impartial world admits-of the French government from first
to last-from the time when, long ago, M. Thouvenel, whom Mr.
Dayton says was a friend, and whose displacement he regretted
-gently hinted the possibility of the war becoming protracted
and bloody, down to the last offer of friendly intervention,
pendente lite, within the present month. This steady and considerate friendliness was disturbed by no hostile act-no departure from practical neutrality. No armed vessels left the ports
of France-no contrnband commodities were shipped thence.
The indiscretions here, such as the ostentatious enlistment of
the Orleans princes in the Federal army, or the welcome to the
Conde de Reus after he had broken away from the French cooperation in Mexico, seemed to make no impression on the
really friendly sentiment in France.* History has well settled
the question, once agitated, of the good faith of the Bourbon
dynasty to us in our time of early trouble. I t must, we think,
pronounce the same judgment on the doings of the dynasty of
their imperial successor.
But Mr. Seward's Minister in Paris was not allowed to see
this, or to act as if he even dreamed of it. The only really
cordial and friendly despatch ever sent is one, suppressed in
this collection, written in February, 1862, on the subject of Court

* The treatment of the Orleans young gentlemen seems to bavo attmcted adverse crHicism in Frnnce. Some time betweeu the 13th ancl 23d of June, )[r.
Dayton wrote a confidential despatch, (No. 1G4,) which is suppressed in this
,oluwe, but the answer shows to what it related. "'l.'he President appreciates
the vigilance and the prudence which suggested your confideutial despatch.
It may be enough to•say, in reply, that the Comte de Paris and the Due de
Chartres, after a year's service in the army of the United l:ltates, in which they
have conducted themselves with the utmost propriety and the highest gallantry,
have returned to Europe. It is not to be doubted that they carry with them
the affectionate gratitude of the American people. 'l'his, howerer, is a sentiment won by them, not for themselves alone, or even peculiarly, but, as in the
case of Lafayette and Rochambeau, it is a sentiment won by them for France."
The analogy to Lafayette is not happy. The first battle in which be served on
this soil was a defeat, not compar,,ble iu its bloodliness to some we have encountered, but still an appalling defeat. Ile did not rctum to France in the
hour of disaster.
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presentations at the Tuilcries, in which, after saying that
'·it is peculiarly 1mcornfortable at the present moment to find
American citizens leaving their country-a prey to factions
and civil war-disturbing the Court of a friendly power
and embarrassing our representative there with questions of
personal interest and pretension; nfr. Seward adds quite
sensibly, though with a stateliness of which he rarely divests
himself, and at which, in connexion with the trivial topic of
discussion, it is hitrdly posl'ible not to smile :
" Let the Emperor antl Empress of :France receive when they
" will: and as many or few as they will, and let all others, as
" well as those who are admitted, turn their attention to the
" question how they ca,n sen-e their country abroad; and if
" they find no better way to do it than by making their attend,, ance in the saloons of the Tuilerieg, let them return home to
" a country tha.t now, for the first time, and not for a long time,
" needs the actiYe efforts of every one of its loyal children to
" save itself from destruction. Finally, above all things, have
" no question with the Government of France on thid sub" ject. Rather introduce nobody, howerer justly distinguished,
" than let a question of fashion or ceremony appear in the
" records of the important period in which we arc acting
" for the highest interests of our country and of humanity."
No wonl of cordiality comparal,lc to this, is to be found anywhere else. :i\Ir. Dayton's situation was a difficult one, and
11Ir. Seward did nothing to render it less so. Sornetimci:; he is
-at least, so it seems to us, looking at these despatches in
print-almost insulting, as, for instance, when, in March of last
year, in answer to one in which i\Ir. Dayton felicitated himself
on accidentally hearing the views of the administration "from
the newspapers," the Secretary sencls some meagre military
news as to the operations against :New Orleans, prefacing it
with the conjecture: "1 wppose I hazard nothing of publicity
here by informing yoit that General Butler, with au adequate
land force, and Captain Porter, with a fleet, arc already in
motion to secure and hold New Orleans." It was about the
same time that :\Ir. Dayton wrote about the cotton supply, and
said: "Do not delay action, I beg of you, a day beyond the
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time when you can act on this subject with propriety," ancl the
answer was a cold, unsatisfactory one of eight lines, in sharp
contrast with tho pages the Secretary was writing to l\Ir.
Adams, and Pike, and Cameron. Well might Mr. Dayton say,
in reply, "I was a little surprised by tho vague and general
terms in ·which you expressed your intentions, anu felt that tho
Government hero woulu not con::;ider them as explicit and satisfactory as those heretofore used." To this, or other despatches
like this, the answer is stern and repulsive. " To bring the
Emperor to this conviction is your present urgent duty. If
successful in performing it, you will render a benefit to France
worth more than any conquest, while you will direct a stream of
healing oil upon tho wounrls of our afflicted land." To be thus
reminded of one's duty, when conscious of performing it, is anything but agreeable.
In August, Mr. Da,yton's sufferings became intolerable, ancl
compelled him to send it despatch to Washington which tells its
tale of suffering an<l injustice with an emphasis that, if anything
could, must have made an impression:" It would seem to me that you must haYe some information,
" beyond what I receive here, as to the views of France, from
" her minister at Washington. If so, may I beg that you will
" communicate it? I am sure that I need not say that I ask
" this information from no idle curiosity, but as something cs" sential to a useful discharge of my duties here. Nothing can
" be moi-e embarrassing than being in the dark upon mutters
" which may have transpired between yourself and the French
" minister at Washington. As an illustration of this, the only
" knowledge I had of the actual purpose of i\Ir. l\Iercier's re" cent visit to Richmond was obtained first from Lord Cowley,
" the British ambassador, and next, at second hand, from the
"Emperor. You will, under these circumstances, appreciate
" at once my embarrassments in falling into conversation with
" Lord Cowley on this subject. I make this reference, not at
" all as matter of complaint, but only as an illustration of my
" meaning, when I allude to embarrassmonts arising from a
" want of knowledge of what may have transpired, if anything,
" between yourself and .i\Ir. i\Ieroier. I know and fully appre-
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"
"
"
"

ciatc the vast extent of your labors, and it may well be that
nothing has recently been communicated by the French governmcnt. If so, I beg that you will excuse me for directing
your attention to the subject."
This was in August, and l\Ir. Mercier's visit to Richmond
was in April; and though i\Ir. Dayton had been duly informed
of his having gone, no word was ever sent to him as to why he
had gone, or what was the result of his visit. l\Ir. Mercier, as
we now know, wrote all about it to his government instantly on
his return. l\Ir. Seward never told his representatiYc abroad
anything, till he supplicated for some information, and if he did
afterwards, it is suppressed in this publication.
And why, let us here pause and ask, why this mystification
on our side as to l\Ir. l\Iercier's visit to Richmond when there
was none on the other-why was l\Ir. Dayton thus kept in the
dark while the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was thoroughly well informed, and when the only thing the outside world
knew was, that the instant the Gassentli brought the mysterious
wayfarer back, the PresiJ.ent anJ. Mr. Seward rushed to the
Navy Yard to greet her and find out all they could~* 'l'hese
questions are more easily answered now than they could haYc
been a fortnight ago before copies of the" Livrc J aune" reached
this country.
The truth we take to be that, among Mr. Seward's virtues, is
not silence. lie talks, we imagine, as fluently as he writes,
and probably with no greater precision. If l\Ir. Wendell
l'hillips is to be credited, and on matters of fact, we know no
reason thti.t he should not be, l\Ir. Seward, before his accession
to office, talketl Mr. Buchanan's Secretary of State into a sort
of confidence, that he was, and meant to be, a conservative and
Constitution-respecting man, and yet it is to be doubted if he
remembers anything about it now. So, we imagine, with l\Ir.
l\Iercier, for on no other principle can we account for the pal-

* In curious and impressive coutrast with this almost boisterous welcome,
wn.s the austere reserve of the Confederate ExecutiYe to Mr. ~lercier. "N'nyaot
JJt\S cru de,·oir demander {~ voir le President Davis, ii ue ru'a ct,'., fait, i:\. ce sujet,
nncunc insinuation, non plus quo le moindre effort pour donuer a ma presence
uae autre signification que cclle qu'elle avoit rcellemeut."
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pablc difference of recollection between the two witnesses who
have recently been upon the stnn<l, and whose testimony, in no
uncharitable i:;pirit, we parallelize:
Jfr. ,lfcrcier to .llr. Thouvenel, April
13th, 1862.
")fr. Seward told me that I might
add, if I found an opportune occasion,
that according to his convictions, the
North was animated by no spirit of revenge, and that, for himself, he would
be most happy to find himself again in
the Scnnte with all those the South
might choose to send there.
"I undertook this journey (to Richmond) witll the explicit acquiescence
of the Secrttary of State, anJ, ns it
seemed to me, according to his desire/'

Mr. Seward to the Preaident, February
9th, 1863.

":{o suggestions were made to )I.
:Ucrcier, by the Secretary of State, that
induced or were designed or calculated
to induce bim to undertake a mission
to Richmond in April last, or at any
other time. Ile wus not then, nor bas
be or any other person ever been authorized by this Government or by the
Secretary of Stllte to mnke any representntions of nny kind or on any subject to the insurrectionary agents or socalled authorities nt Richmond, or to
bold nny commnnicntion with them on
behnlf of this Government."

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"Since the 4th of )farch, 1861, no
communication, direct or indirect, formal or informal, has been haol by this
Government or by the Secretary of
State with the insurgents, their aiders
or abettors."
"Passports were grnnted at the request of those distinguished persons
respectively, and not on any suggestion of the Government or Secretary of
State. They sevcrnlly tra,·cllcd in a
private and unofficial capncity. They
bore no communicllliou, whether formal or informal, nrbal or written, from
this Government or from the Secretary
of Stnte to any of the insurgents, and
they brought none from any such persons to this Government or to the Secretary of State."

We cannot but think that the suppressed passages of l.\Ir.
Seward's despatch, of the 23d of August, in answer to l\Ir.
Dayton's supplication for light as to l\Ir. l.\Iercier's visit to
Richmond might illustrate this problem, and give us l.\Ir.
Seward's version of his interviews, written at a time when the
radical opposition of his own party was not threatening him ;
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and Lord Lyons must know what l\Ir. Mercier told him at the
time of the conferences.
But let us hasten on to the closing scene of this busy year as
it is revealed, not only in these papers, but in those which have
been more recently given to the world on both sides of the
Atlantic. It is full of interest.
The clouds began to gather in France as early as October,
when M. Thouvenel was suspcrseded, and 11. Drouyn de Lhuys
came into office. 1\Ir. Dayton saw the significance of this. "We
lose a friend," said he, "at an important point," and one cannot
but smile at the meagre consohtion that he finds, in the fact
artlessly and honestly stated, that (speaking of 11. Drouyn de
Lhuys) "his perfect knowledge of our language will, to a certain extent, facilitate our official intercourse." The President's
proclamation reached Paris soon after, accompanied by a most
remarkable minatory despatch from :Mr. Seward, and was communicated to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who simply said,
that "ours was a great question, and that he should endeavour
to study it as soon as possible." This was on the 21st of
October; and, in nine days from that date, having, it is to be
supposed, mastered "the great question," l\l. Drouyn de Lhuys
wrote his despatch to the English and Russian cabinets, asking
them to unite in an offer of friendly introduction with a view to
an armistice. This important step does not appear to have
been known to l\Ir. Dayton till after the 6th, for, on that day,
he sends an account of a conference he had had with the French
Minister, who told him "that everything remained as it had
done for some time past. That France, in common with the
other powers of Europe, very much regrctte<l the war and its
continuance, but that they had no purpose to intervene or
interfere in any way." How far this is consistent with perfect candour, or how far a public man is bound to reveal to
a, party in interest, the fact of the mere initiation of a correspondence is a question we do not feel competent to deci<lc. Mr.
Seward, anxious enough to find ground of censure, docs not
seem to have found fault with it, but puts his complaint on what
seems to us, and will seem to Europe, the strange ground, that
the action of the Great Powers " was a conference"-" an
4
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inconclusive conference" he calls it-to which the United States
should have been invited.
But 1\Ir. Seward and the Cabinet at Washington found it
easier and safer to condemn their own Minister than to resent
anything that France might do; and, accordingly, the papers
recently volunteered to tho public and which, by-the-by, were
not given, until the contents of the "Livrc J aunc" reached this
country and remlcred our 'Premier's' tenure of office and
influence precarious-these papers reveal an act of injustice to
a distant and patriotic public servant, which it is due to common fair play to expose and condemn. If l\Ir. Dayton were
within reach, it looks as if Mr. Holt and the Government
detectives might be directed against him, and, as if the Administration were glad of a chance to rebuke him for his refractoriness a year ago on the private war question ; or to verify the
threat which has been attributed to l\Ir. Lincoln, that, as New
Jersey had never <lone anything for him, he would take the
first chance to punish New Jersey.
What is Mr. Dayton's offence, that called for Secretary Sewarcl's rebuke? On the 6th of November, as we have seen, he
knew nothing of the Armistice proposition. He did know of it,
howeYct, before the 16th, for, on that day, he wrote a remonstrance-earnest, respectful, confident, though ineffectual remonstrance-directed mainly to convince the French minister
that he was mistaken iu supposing that there was, or ever had
been, an equality of strength between the contending forces
here, or that, " after so much bloodshed, they are now in the
same position as at first." There was but one phrase in this
letter, which, by possibility, could give offence at Washington.
It was that in which ~Ir. Dayton did some sort of justice to
the valour of the confederates. "In Virginia," said he, "the
insurgents have advanced and retreated. They have gained
battles and have lost them. I do not mean to depreciate their
gallantry; they are yet rny countrymen, and here, at least,
they have shown equality of strength."
When this despatch reached the State Department, we were
on the eve of the hideous sacrifice at Fredericksburg, when
the Administration knew they were pursuing a course which
involved terrible hazard, and when it was "treasonable" to
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admit even to themselves, that, in Virginia, there had been,
and might be, again "equality of strength."* The Presidential orders had been issued to make the bloody experiment against the frowning batteries which overlooked the
Rappahannock. The Cabinet was anxious and irritable. l\Ir.
Dayton had written a despatch on the 10th of November, which
has not been printed, and which contained evidently some exasperating hint, or some annoying inquiry as to what had been
said to :i.\fr. :i.\Icrcier, or what Mr. l\Iercier had been authorized
to say. It was a subject on which :i.\Ir. Seward was nervous,
and he writes : " In reply to a suggestion in your despatch, it is proper for
" me to say that neither 1\I. Mercier nor any other person has
" had the least warrant from any authority of the United States
" for representing to his Government that the President would
" be disposed to entertain any proposition in regard to the
" action of this Government in the conduct of our domestic
" affairs from any foreign quarter whatsoever. The exact con" trary is, in effect, all that bas ever passed between all the
" ministers residing hero and this department. You will judge
" whether it is important to clear up this point at Pn,ris."
On, or immediately before the 5th of December, :i.\Ir. Dayton's
remonstrance and argument against the French project arrived,
and lllr. Seward, as if angry that anybody but himself should
argue, or prophecy, or "discourse,"t sends a despatch to 1\Ir.
Dayton, the import of which cannot be mistaken:DEPAR'tMENT OF STATE,

}

W ASIIIXGTO~, Doc. 5th, 1862.
Srn: Your despatch of Nov. 18, No. 227, has been received.
Having already inuicated the course which the President has
decided to auopt concerning the late proceedings of the French
.,. As to Fredericksburg, there is in General Hooker's testimony before the
Senate Committee tho following inexplicable pnssage: "It was just dark.
Finding I had lost as many men as my orders required me to lo~c, I suspended
the attack."-Senate Document No. 71, page 25.
t "I do not discourse to-day upon the military position."-Mr. Seward to llr.
Adams, page 3i9.
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government, it is not necessary now for me to review the note
which, in the absence of instructions, you have written to i\I.
Drouyn de Lbuys.
I am sir, your obedient servant,
W111.

II.

SEWARD.

And, on the 11th, be repeats this reprimand, showing that,
had the French answer been other than it was, the language of
rebuke would haYc been still stronger : " From my previous despatches you will probably have in" fcrred that the President did not expect you to open a corrcs" pondcnce with M. Drouyn de Lhuys upon the subject of the
" proposition concerning American affairs, which the Emperor
" has recently submitted to the Emperor of Russia and the
" Queen of Great Britain. Insomuclt as you have done so
'' without consulting this government, and have thus drawn forth
" from the imperial government a frank and friendly answer, it
" is only proper that you should now inform M. Drouyn de
" Lhuys that his note has been submitted to the President, and
" that he is gratified with the explanations it gives of the
" present policy of the Emperor in regard to the United States."
With Mr. Dayton's manly and earnest reply, which shows
how deeply he felt the wrong that had been clone, this chapter
of mismanaged statesmanship may be said to close:December 23, 1862.
"Srn: Your despatch of December 5, No. 265, is received.
" You simply acknowledge the receipt of my despatch of
"November 18, No. 227, and say that, 'having already indi" cated the course which the President has decided to adopt
" concerning the late proceedings of the French government, it
" is unnecessary for me to review the note, which, in the
" absence of instructions, you (I) have written to M. Drouyn
" de Lhuys.' I had supposed that that note, as it did not
" assume to indicate any policy, but merely to sum up briefly
" the successes of our army and the governmental resources, in
" hopes of its having weight in any future deliberation of this
" government, could not fail at least to meet the approbation of
" the department. My general instructions in reference to the
" subject-mll-tter were most ample, and I had held Yerbal con" PARIS,
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" ference with M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the subject before. Ile
"told me what he had done; and I could answer when, perhaps,
" the government could not. The emergency, I thought, not
'' only justified, but required, that in view of the possible future,
" I should put my verbal suggestions in writing. As one useful
" result, at all events, I have received the important eommuni" cations of l\I. Drouyn de Lhuys, of N ovcmber 23d last, a
"copy of which accompanied my despatch, No. 231. I may
" add, also, that I felt that it was but just to myself that my
"com1trymen, as well as the government, should sec and know
" that I had not failed, in the crisis which had occurred, fairly
" to represent its condition.
"I am, sir, your obedient servant,
WM.

\

L.

DAYTO.X."

Nothing now rem::tins but a sort of postscript of negotiations
or correspondence, the interest and import of which cannot be
measured till we have the news of the manner in which it is received on the other si!le of the .Atlantic; Mr. Seward's last
published despatch to Mr. Dayton, of the 6th of February,
being now on the ocean, having been printed before it was sent
to its destination. Its issue is quite as momentous as was the
undecided question of the Trent.
The reader of these pages must have seen the clear conviction under which they arc written, that the action of the French
Government from :first to last, with perhaps one exception, has
been candid, entirely ingenuous and friendly. No credit perhaps is due for this, for the interest France has in the integrity
and welfare of tho UniteJ. States, as they once were, is palpable. We believe :i\1. Drouyn de Lhuys said the actual truth
when he wrote : "I assure you that our friendly dispositions
have not changed. If, some clay, the Americans, tired of turning their valor against themselves, should wish to have recourse
to us, in order to seek, in concert, the means of terminating
this conflict they would find us always ready, associated with
other powers or separately, to aid them with our co-01)eration,
and to testify by our good offices, the feelings which have not
ceased to animate France in regard to them." But it is also
apparent, that the Lincoln Government, as reprcsentecl anrl
controlled by :i\Ir. Seward, never thought so, or if they did,

have never been able ;;o far to reconcile it with their poor notions of policy and their cnwen fears of the ra,lical clement, as to
be "illing to say so.
It is impossible to regaril the decision on the last French
proposition of a. negotiation, pcrnling hostilities, in any other
light, or to think of it, without a just solicitude as to the possible consequences of a refusal to listen to the voice of fricnrlly
counsel, its object being peace-peace among brethren, "for
such," says l\Ir. Dayton, "we yet arc," peace in an ngonized
arnl bloo(htained lallll-peace with the chances of seeing a
restoration on this c011tinent, of great commonwealth~, which
mny raise the American name and prowess from the aby.,s in
which they have now sunk. One of two conser1uence;;, it requires no skill of prophesy to know, must follow-that ]!'ranee
(and ,vith it the other great powers,) wearic<l of the material
sacrifices they have been making, anil angercu at the ob,luracy
with which all intercession is n:jected, may recognize the
Southern Confederacy, and give it the vast moral support which
mere recognition will confer-or that, wearinc~s and disgust
taking another couri;e, they may leave us to the arbitrament
which we h:we chosen, an,l which no human power, no course of
events, no success, no disappointment, induces us to relinquish.
W11y, but for motives purely personal and having reference
to the microcosm of small politics, in which he has always
moved, ~Ir. Scwaru shoul<l have rmlcly rcfuse,l to listen to the
counsel, for it was nothing more, and not intervention nor mediation, of the French Government, it is difficult to understand.
One may imagine, irnlecd, how it might haYe been turneu to the
prejudice of the Confederates, if t/11:y had declined to accede to
it. It is difficult to sec any reason for our refusing it. Still
it has been refused, and we must abitle the issue, as we did that
of the Trent retraction, with deep solicitude, nnd, as 1Ir. Seward hopes, no doubt, with a readiness, should 110 evil result follow, to claim it as a new diplomatic triumph.
Were it not a subject so full of gravity in every respect it
would not be unprofitable, before the judgment of what .Mr.
Seward somewhere, in truly Chinese style, calls "the outside
world," is known, to look at it criticnlly, for the conduct of the
whole affair is very characteristic. 'i\Ir. Dayton communicated
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the fact that the Emperor meant to offer his friendly counsel, in
a. note, made very laconic by his sense of recent injury. The
counsel was offered on the 3d of the present month, in language,
the friendly, deferential tone of which could not be surpassed.
Commissioners were to be named, privately and informally, if
need be. They were to meet-that is, if both belligerents agreed,
and if they did not, the advantage enured to the one who did,
and, in the language of the French despatch, which to our ears,
sounds like the accents of a kind and anxious friend :
"In place of the accusations which North and South mutu" ally cast upon each other at this time, would be substituted an
" argumentative discussion of the interests which divide them.
" They would seek out, by means of well-ordered and profound
" deliberations, whether these interests are definitively irrecon" cilea,ble, whether separation is an extreme which can no longer
"be avoided, or whether the memories of common existence,
" vrhcther the ties of any kind which have made of the North
" and of the South one sole and whole federative state, and
" have borne them on to so high a degree of prosperity, arc not
" more powerful than the causes which have placed arms in the
"hands of the two populations."
To this counsel, in three days, Mr. Seward sent his answer
of llonial. It is but fair to say that his attitude, relatively to
his own party just now, is not favourable to repose, or deliberation, or conciliatory action. The temptation to be exacting and
repellant, and denunciatory is very great at this moment. It
has not been resisted. The answer is elated on the 6th, ancl
was, as we have said, instantly published. It has all the marked
peculiarities of 1\Ir. Seward's rhetoric. No one else on the
roll of statesmen, or of such as claim to be statesmen, would venture at this moment of anxious suspense to say, as he does, that
the Federal Government now holds half of North Carolina and
Mississippi, ancl one-third of South Carolina !* No one but

* The official paper at Washington, which prints " from the originnl in the
State Department," makes, on this extraordinary statement, the following just
comment: "Accustomed as we have been to the complaints of factious politicians, this brief retrospect of our Army and Na,y will only surprise the
American people less than the great Power for whose benefit it is made."Chronicle, February 14th, 1862.
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Mr. Seward would insinuate to a courteous correspondent that
he had, to use his peculiar words, "taken other light" to guide
his footsteps than such as was radiated from his Department, or
would, all things considered, be surprised if he had. No one
else would have described the people of this country "as a
Peace Democracy." No one but l\Ir. Seward would venture to
say, and hope to be believed, "that our credit is adequate to
the existing emergency," or would at this time of day, revive
the cant of' loyal men in the South' represented in Congress, the
representatives being refugees elcctccl by military authority,and, least of all, no one, we arc very sure, but Mr. Seward,
would meet the the practical, and if not practical, perfectly intelligible, suggestion of a commission on neutral ground, with
what we can construe in no other vrny than the poor sarcasm of
saying that the Congress of the United States is the proper
" forum for debates between alien:1ted parties," whose "vacant
seats are inviting back the Senators and Representatives of the
discontented." Whether the force and point of this sarcasm
will be appreciated by the Imperial councils, we do not pretend
to conjecture. 1\Ir. Dayton, in one of his moments of despondency last summer, well said: "At a court where there is a
power-a thinking, acting power-behind the ministry, we can
never feel quite sure of our position ; and it is on the decision
of that power, when he shall have received l\Ir. Seward's rebuke, that more depends than can be easily measured. As we
have said, action and inaction arc alike portentous.
The deep interest of these later revelations has led us away
from the immediate subject of review, and having exhausted our
space, we shall not recur to it. Attention has been naturally
directed to Mr. Seward's "diplomacy" with the two leading
foreign powers, but there is a vast fund beside, on which we ha,Ye
not drawn. The correspondence with Russia, whence Mr. Chy
wrote (and Mr. Seward prints) that "money and men should be
sent into Ireland, India, and all the British dominions, all over
the world, to stir up revolt; for our cause is just, and vengeance
will sooner or later oYertakc that perfidious aristocracy;" and
Mr. Cameron informed the government that "the fountains of
Pctcrhoff were set in operation and a sumptuous dinner provided" for his benefit; and Prince Gortachow told i\Ir. Taylor,
as late as October : "Your situation is getting worse and worse.
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The chances of preser\"'ing the Union arc gro'l'l"ing more and more
desperate. Can nothing he done to ~top this dreadful war ?"-is
very suggestive. So is that with Spain, and Mexico, whore Mr.
Corwin amused himself with making treaties which were rejected,
and the ~Icxicans, on the faith of them, drawing bills which were
protesteu; and Prussia, anu Ilollan1l, and Japan, and Chinaand the Central~Amcrican States, who rose as one man against
l\Ir. Lincoln's negro deportation scheme, and, as our ministers
said, "regardc,l it as tho greatest degradation for the country
to be OYerrun with blacks" (p. 891,) or "to be visited by a
plague of which the United States desired to rid themselves."
(p. !)00.) Morocco, where a consul with a gu:nd of l\Ioors
captured an officer of the Sumter, and a Southern traveller, an<l
sent them home in irons, to be discharged or exchanged as prisoners of war, is a curious chapter; and most curious and discreditable
of all is that of Brazil, where Mr. Webb insisted on making, at his
reception, " a longer speech" than his predecessor, and whose
style of writing to his Government and mode of diplomatic action, may be jnclgcd of by the following passage from one of his
despatches to Mr. Seward:
"Robert G. Smith, our late consul, was an open-mouthed
" traitor and a loud talker. He said, on different occasions,
'' ' Meade is the greatest traitor of the two, and if he ever gets
" back to Virginia, it will be in consequence of his disguising
" himself.' Ile said lie dared not show himself in N cw York or
"any Northern State; an<l finally left here with his wife, who
" is from Maine, in an English ship for Liverpool. l\Iy im" pression is, that he has sailed for Quebec under a feigned
"name, and if at tho North, he is doubtless somewhere in the
" vicinity of his wife's relations. It is fortunate for him that
" ho is not here, as he would unquestionably find himself a pas" senger on board a coffee ship bound for New York, and under
" command of a loyal shipmaster, as there would be no difficulty
"in sending the traitors home without coming in collision with
" tho Brazilian authorities. Our consul reports that a very
" decidedly better feeling exists among all Americans here, and
" that the oath of allegiance is cheerfully taken by nine-tenths
" of tho shiprnasters, while oven those of rebel proclivities admit
" its justice, and, after making m·y faces, take the oath sooner
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"
"
"
"
"
"

than be refused their papers. Some of them had sworn
roundly that they never would take the oath prescribed ; and
it is a matter of great exultation and pride with the loyal
masters to perceive how thoroughly the blusterers, who boasted
of their secession propensities and their secession flags, have
been humbled before the authority of the United States Government exercised in the most quiet way possible."

This review is closed in a spirit not more cheerful than that
in which it was begun. If the civil war, in which Providence,
for our national wrong-doings, has plunged us, had, in its fearful
processes, evolved one master-spirit-one great man, Soldier or
Statesman, on whom, as the darkness and the danger grew, the
hope of the nation might rest, and who should seem tp be able
to load us out of the labyrinth in which we are condemned to
wander, there would be a sort of consolation. But mediocrity,
or loss than mediocrity, reigns everywhere. It is the time and
the scene of shaliow-half-educatetl, light-minded men in executive council. Day after day rolls on, and the hideous monotony of blood is only varied by revelations of corruption and
peculation in places high and low-from the gigantic contractors
of unseaworthy fleets down to the colonel who cheats the Government by forging dead soldiers' names. Fierce fanaticism
has full sway in tho cabinet and out of it. It seems to be the
only positive principle; and before it, tho Constitution and its
guarantees have been broken down. For this conquest-for
this triumph of lawless power oYer constitutional right-for this
connivance against knowledge in the imagined exigencies of the
times to overthrow the law-for the unlawful arrests and cruel
imprisonments that have been perpetrated and are yet justified
-for the foreign policy of the Government, which, as wc have
tried to show, has gained nothing and sacrificed everything,
and, has now brought us back to where we were little more than
a year ago-a position of anxious dependence on the will of
strangers-for all this, no one, in our poor judgment, is more responsible than the public man whose writings we have endeavoured fairly to review; and who now, unless rumor be utterly
false, distrusted and proscribed by the radicals of his own party,
is seeking to be tho leader, in conjunction with the kindred
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spirits who have always clustered round him, in a new PseudoConservative party, who imagine they can restore to life the
Union which they have stabbed, ancl the Constitution they have
violated. The quotation is trite, but it has an actual truth,
even in its misapplication:" Non tali auxilio,-nec defensoribus istis
Tempus eget."

The .Ship of State is among the reefs and breakers, with
gloom and danger threatening outside. The pilot to weather
the storm is not among those on deck. The hands that steered
it into peril cannot be trusted for rescue-the chief mate least
of all.

P OS TS C RI P T·.
Since the first edition of this pamphlet appeared, the Parliamentary Papers on American affairs, as well as the' LivreJaune,'
ha,·e reached this country. They fully confirm the views stated
in the preceding pages, of the impotent diplomacy of our Foreign Secretary. They show much more. They show that,
while no act of wrong or word of unkindness is attributable to
the French Government or people, every page of l\Ir. Seward's
and Earl Russell's correspondence, is disfigured by sternness, if
not ill nature, on one part, ancl tame submissiveness on the
other. The proof of this is abundant, and where positive evidence is wanting of words of offence being directly communicated to Mr. Seward, the official and voluntary publication of
these Parliamentary papers, has now brought them and their
re,·elations to his notice, and, if he ever troubles himself about
such serious things, to that of Mr. Lincoln. It will cost little
trouble to demonstrate this.
The negociation between Mr. Seward and the English and
French ministers, as to an outlet for cotton, is a sad one, because
it not only proves an apparent want of directness and candor, or
the absence of influence in the cabinet, but it shows that
such deficiencies were at once detected, and cautiously guarded
against. This is summed up in one sentence from Lord Lyons'
despatch of the Hlth December last; "Mr. Seward observed
with regard to my first question that neutral property was guarantied by assurances given over and over again by this Government. To the second question, General Butler's proclamation
would, he said, be a sufficient answer; but the case might now
be altered, for General Banks had probably, by this time, super-
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seded General Butler, and the new plan might have been put
in force. I communicated to Mr. Mercier what Mr. Seward had
said, and after some consideration we came to the conclusion
that the only thing which would have any chance of being attended with a practical result would be to endeavour to obtain
from Mr. Seward some assurance in writing. On reflection, I
became convinced that a mere informal declaration from Mr.
Seward would not be sufficient. I could not feel sure that such a
document would be held to be binding by all the departments
of the government. I remembered with regard to the proclamation of General Butler, on which Mr. Seward laid so much
stress, that at the very moment, at which l\fr. Seward had accepted from Mr. Stuart compliments on this proclamation, orders
had, without bis knowledge, been issued, which rendered the
concessions made by it altogether inoperative in practice. I came
therefore to the conclusion that nothing would be gained unless
I procmed a regular formal document from the whole government."
This is disparaging enough, but it is not all.
It is, as has been said, not easy to determine which part
of the contents of these despatches was communicated to the
Secretary of State. Some of them, probably were not, but the
publication is, as lawyers say, notice to all the world, i\!r. Seward included, of what the British Government had been doing,
and thinking, and writing. When, therefore, Lord Lyons in
his despatch of the 17th of November, (to which so much absurd
criticism has lately been directed,) used the language we are
about to quote, he revealed an inner truth which, now that it is
authoritatively disclosed, must grate harshly upon the callous
nerves of the federal administration, one and all.
"The experience of the past is certainly not calculated to
inspire any great confidence in the results of these warlike preparations, but the political interests of the party now in power
render a continuance of the war a necessity to it. Its only
chance of regaining its lost popularity lies in successful military
operations. Unless it can obtain a much higher place in public
estimation than it now occupies, not only will its tenure become
extremely precarious, but some of its leading members may be
called to a severe account for their extra-legal proceedings."
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Lord Lyons was writing dismal truth. But this is not all.
As far back as August, 1862, the Charge ad interirn, :i.\Ir.
Stuart, wrote (and the letter is published !) in relation to the
passport system :
" ·whatever may be the amount of private dismay and inconvenience occasioned by these orders, they have been received by
the press with the usual approbation given to arbitrary acts during this war."
Nor is this all. On the 26th of September, Mr. Stuart wrote
a despatch, (and this is published!) in reference to the executive suspension of the Habeas Corpus:
"It may be said to place the whole nation under martial law.
Personal liberty will now only exist by military sufferance.
Your Lordship will observe that there is no law quoted in justification of this unprecedented usurpation of power, except that
of a so-called necessity. The nation has shown itself so little
jealous of its liberties during the past months, that the proclamation will probably be accepted with submission as an essential act of vigor for the successful prosecution of the war."
Nor is this all. On the 7th of November, after the New
York election, Mr. Stuart wrote (and this too is published!)" The gains of the Democratic party have been so great that
they a.re considered to constitute a political revolution. The
extreme and unconstitutional policy of the government has no
doubt been the principa.1 cause of this general change of feelings,
--either inflicting injury or spreading terror through the country, without producing any equivalent success in the conduct of
the war. * * * I ma.y add that disgust with the war and desire
for peace has been amongst the principal ca.uses, subordinate
only to the policy of which they are the effect, of the present
conservative resurrection."*
Tho retention of office by Mr. Sc,vard and his associates, one
would think, poorly corn pensa tcs for the humiliation of being thus
made conscious that, in the judgment of tho representatives of
the nation to which they have surrendered every thing, the effect
of their policy is 'disgust.'

* In the Blne Book No. 1, p. 31, is Earl Russell's entire approval of }Ir. Stuart's acts and correspondence; approYal of his " temper, discretion and judgment."
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On the 21st of July 18G2, the British Charge wrote an account of a conversation he had had with the Secretary, who was
in buoyant spirits, bis wonderful elasticity showing itself even
in the dreary interval between McClellan's retreat and Pope's
discomfiture. "It would be" so Mr. Stuart reports ~fr. Seward
to say, "sufficient to have captured the ports and collect customs, to hold the Mississippi and the other na.vigaLle rivers, and
to occupy certain strategic points, and that this <lone, the Southern States might well be left to themselves. Some six or nine
months would probably be sufficient to bring them to reason."
And then Mr. Stuart aclds, as if pa.rt of the same executive
revelation, "Amongst the means relied upon for weakening the
South, is included a servile war."
It would be dismal work to turn back to the newspapers of
last July, then, as still, the organs of the government, and the
deputy despots of the land, but it may be assumed that no such
fearful whisper as this, of a bloody intention to excite a servile
revolt in the Southern States, as a mode of depleting them when
left to themselves, had been given to the American public. Mr.
Sew:m1, in a despatch of which he was very proud (IJespatclies,
1862, pp. 105, 124), had himself deplored servile war "as productive of infinite suffering throughout the world," and yet here
he was, if Mr. Stuart tells the truth, as we doubt not he docs,
hinting it coolly to a stranger, and that stranger, as was his
duty, reporting it to his government. Let us see what was the
reward,-a despatch from Earl Russell to Mr. Stuart, written
instantly,-but three days clapsing,-on the receipt of this ominous hint; in which no notice whatever is taken of Mr. Seward's
prophecies of success. The few words of the despatch are these:
"FOREIGN OFFICE, August 7, 1862.
"Srn: With reference to tho paragraph in your despatch of
the 21st ultimo, in which you say that a servile wa,r is included
in the means relied upon for weakening the South, I have to
observe that the prospect of a servile war will only make other
nations more desirous to sec an end of the desolating and destructive conflict.
I am, &c.,
To Mr. Stuart.
RussELL."
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The history of diplomacy affords no stronger specunen of
stern rebuke than these few lines, from one who, without offence
or inaccuracy, may be described as an anti-slavery statesman
of the strictest school.*
Nor was this language of asperity directed only to Mr.
Seward. Mr. Adams had his full share of it. On the 20th
of November he made an earnest and elaborate complaint as to
the 'Alabama,' to which Earl Russell replied, a month laterusing, inter alia, these words, which it is quite needless for us
to characterize.
"If it be sought to make her Majesty's Government responsible to that of the United States, because arms and munitions
of war have left this country on account of the Confederate
Government; that Confederate Government, as the other belligerent, may very well maintain that it has a just cause of complaint against the British Government, because the United
States Arsenals had been replenished from British sources. Nor
would it be possible to deny, that, in defiance of the Queen's
Proclamation, many subjects of Her Majesty, owing allegiance
to her crown, have enlisted in the armies of the United States.
Of this fact you cannot be ignorant. Her Majesty's Government therefore have just grounds of complaint against both of
the belligerent parties, but most especially against tho Government of the United States, for having systematically, and in
disrcgartl of that comity of nations, which it was their duty to
observe, induced subjects of Iler Majesty to violate those orders

* So, seem to think all t be leading men of this school. On the Emancipation Proclamation appearing, Sir T. Fowell Buxton wrote to the Eveni11g
Nail:-" In your paper of to-day you ask "whether the sons of Wilberforce
and of Buxton, who havo all been brought up in tho teaching of their fathers,
now share the opinions of the present Emancipation Society as to the Proclamation of Mr. Lincoln."
If the Proclamation means anything-if it is not a dead Jetter-it means to
attack the weak point of the South by exciting an insurrection among the
slaves-an insurrection which would commence by producing untold misery to
many isolated families of whites, and would inevitably end in a wholesale
massacre of the un11rmcd, ill-organized, ignorant uegroes. Can you seriously
ask whether the sons of Wilberforce and of Buxton approve this?
In the canse of the negro himself, I cannot regard with approval the act of
Mr. Lincoln, which, if effective, must bring about "so horrible a termination
of slavery" as a servile war."
5
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which in conformity with her neutral position she has enjoined
all her subjects to obey."
This, howcYer, was guarded an<l moderate language compared
with the last extract from this part of the dreary correspondence
which wo havo temper and patience to make. Especially is
attention called to the final question addressed by Earl Russell
to the representative of the once proud United States.
" I must ask first," says Lord Russell to Mr. Adams, "What
are the circumstances within the control of the Government, to
which you allude? Do you mean that Her Majesty's Government, in construing a penal statute, or in carrying into effect
the provisions of a penal statute, should hurry at once to a decision, and seize a ship, building and fitting out at Liverpool,
without being satisfied by evidence, that the provisions of the
foreign enlistment act had been violated in the case of such
vessel? Do you mean that Her Majesty's Government shouhl
dispense with proof and inflict injury upon the Queen's subjects,
by seizing a ship, upon your mere assertion that the owners of
the ship were violating the law ! If such is your meaning, I
must reply that the Government of this country respect the law.
They do not seize upon property, to the loss and damage of its
owners, without proof that they are legally entitled to do so.
Perhaps your meaning is that Her Majesty's Government should
have proceeded on the opinion of l\Ir. Collyer without waiting
for other authority. But here again I must reply that the usage
of this country requires that the Government should consult
their own legal advisers, and obtain the opinion of the law
officers of the crown, before they proceed to enfor ce a penal
statute. If you mean to contend, therefore, that a nation in a
state of profound peace, should set aside the formalities of law,
and act at once upon presumptions and surmises, I entirely differ from you. * * * *
"If you mean that her Majesty's Government wilfully delayed
or neglected the measures by which the character of the Alabama
could have been legally ascertained, I must give a positive and
complete denial of the truth of any such assertion."
Turning again to this side of the Atlantic-one hardly knows
whether to smile or blush at the equanimity-almost frivolity,
(for inappropriate jocularity seems to infect the whole Govern-
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ment) with which an American Prime l\Iinister accepts a sneer
at the hands of one whom he dares not offend. Let the extracts
speak for themselves :
"nlr. Sewa,rd," wrote Lord Lyons on the 2d December, "without my having in any way led to the subject, spoke to me yesterday of the proposal made by France to Great Britain and Russia,
to unite in advising the belligerents in this country to agree to 3Jl
armistice. He said that he perceived that some of the European
powers, all professing the most frienuly feelings to this country,
had been discussing its affairs amongst themselves, without
taking the cabinet of Washington into their councils. However,
as no official communication had been made to this Government,
it was not called upon to give any opinion, or to say what it
should or should not have done, if any proposal had been made
to it. If any of the European powers concerned, should offer
explanations on the subject, this Government would receive them
respectfully, but would not be disposed to express any opinion
on them."
On the 19th, Earl Russell replied : " I have received your lordship's despatch of the 2tl instant,
and with respect to Mr. Seward's remarks, unprovoked on your
part, that he perceived that some of the European powers, all
professing the most friendly feelings to the United States, had
been discussing its affairs amongst themselves, without taking·
the cabinet of Washington into their councils, I have to instruct
you to take an opportunity of observing to Mr. Seward, that,
without taking other reasons into consideration, the perusal of
the accounts of the distress in Lancashire, owing to the want of
cotton, which he will find in all the newspapers, will furnish him
with reason enough for the discussion of American affairs in
Europe. Great numbers of Iler i\Iajesty's subjects arc suffering severe distress in consequence of the belligerent operations
of the cabinet at Washington."
Lord Lyons to Earl Russell, January 7th, 1863 : " In obedience to your lordship's orders, I, this morning, took
an opportunity of observing that without taking other reasons
into consideration, the accounts of the distress in Lancashire,
would furnish him with reason enough for the discussion of
American affairs in Europe.
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"~Ir': Seward took the observation in very 900d pa1·t, and said
tha.t the distress of the operatives in Europe was, indeed, a. most
painful subject of reflection!"
Our last citation refers not to the Secretary, but to l\lr. Lincoln himself. There is in it a force of truthfulness which cxperates the blow.
"The Proclamation," writes Lord Russell, on tho 17th January, 1863, "of the President of tho United States, enclosed in
your Lordship's despatch of the 2nd instant, appears to be of a
very strange nature. It professes to emancipate all slaves in
places where the United States authorities cannot exercise any
jurisdiction, nor make emancipation a reality, but it does not
decree emancipation of slaves in any States or parts of States
occupied by Federal troops, and subject to United States jurisdiction, and where, therefore, emancipation, ifdecreed, might have
been carried into effect. It wouhl seem to follow, that in the
Borclcr States, and also in New Orleans, a slave-owner may recover his fugitive slave by the ordinary process of law; but that
in the ten States in which the Proclamation decrees emancipation,
a fugitive slave, arrested by legal wtirrant, may resist and his
resistance, if successful, is to be upheld and aided by the United
States authorities and tho United States armed forces.
"'l'he Proclamation therefore makes slavery at once legal and
illegal, and makes slaves either punishable for running away
from their masters, or entitled to be suppot·ted and encouraged
in so doing, according to the locality of the plantation to which
they belong, and the loyalty of the State in which they may
happen to be.
"There seems to be no declaration of a principle adverse to
slavery in this Proclamatiom. It is a measure of war, and a
measure of war of a very questionable kind.
"As President Lincoln has twice appealed to the judgment of
mankind in his Proclamation, I venture to say I do not think it
can, or ought to satisfy tho friends of abolition, who look for
total and impartial freedom for the slave, and not for vengeance on the slave-owner."
And now our limits arc exhausted, and allow room for but a
single comment. That the correspondence of the French
Minister with his Government does not contain equally dis-
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paraging comments on our domestic and foreign policy, the
writer is far from affirming. They have not however been given
to the world; for the 'Livre Ja.une' is searched in vain for an
unkind word, or the shadow of a sneer, or a rebuke. Yet to
France, the tone of Mr. Soward and his satellites has been
almost defiant. The policy of tho Executive in its welcome to
the Orleans adventurers, (who have gone home to patronize
Mr. Kinglako,) has been offensive. To Great Britain, from the
dismal December day when Mr. Seward, after conniving at the
bluster about the Trent, kissed tho rod and surrendered l\lr.
Slidell and Mr. Mason,-through the continuity of humiliations
-the Gilchrist nolle prosequi-tho Slave trade treaty-the
Bermudn.--the Sunbeam, (it may be the Petorhoff,) and the
facts revealed in these Parliamentary papers, it has been-until
very lately-to use a mild term-obsequious in the extreme.
And the fruit of all this! What is it? Is it security? Is
it confidence that foreign intervention or the danger of a foreign
war has been averted. Far-very far from it. Either may
come at any instant. As a desperate resort, war may be provoked to save the abolition party. It looks very much as if it
would be. Every hour that slips by, without voluntary pacification, makes our conclition worse. Wo are feebler now than we
were when Mr. Seward put his signature to the despatch giving up
the Trent prisoners. Trust in our rulers is we:i,kened. Our resources in money and men arc less. Mr. Chase is rapidly "continentalising" our currency. Conscription is the fierce order of
the day. There are more than two hundred thousand poor fellows sleeping in their bloody graves, or wandering, crippled and
mutilated, through the wards of our Ilospitals, who, then, were
alive and well, and healthy and strong, and willing to fight. And
all this is the bitter fruit of Mr. Lincoln's home policy and Mr.
Seward's diplomacy.
Is there any remedy, or redress? Let the page of our ancient
history answer the question, for surely there is no treason in
the echo of a voice which spoke words of warning long ago.
Just eighty-six years have rolled by since a soldier of the
Revolution,-of high renown and unquestioned patriotism,under circumstances closely resembling those of our day of
alarm and sorrow-thus wrote to a friend in Great Britain:
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"The dismemberment of the Empire, the loss of commerce
and power and consequence among nations, with the downfall
of public credit, are but the beginning of those evils which
must be followed by a thousand more, unless timely prevented
by some lenient hand-some great State physician-aided and
supported by men as independent in their fortunes as unsullied
in their honour, who have never yet bowed their heads to Ba:11.
Such a man, so suppO\·ted, may yet save the sinking State by
confirming that independence which this people arc resolved to
part with only when they leave the world. Such a man will do
what all wise statesmen have done before him. Ile will be true
to the welfare and interest of his country-and he will endeavour
to preserve so much of the empire in prosperity and honour as
the circumstances of the times and the mal-administration of
those who ruled before him, have left this Government. The
States of America are willing to be the friends but will never
submit to be the slaves of the parent country. They are by
consanguinity, by commerce, by language, and by the affection
which naturally springs from them, more attached to you than
any other country under the sun. Therefore, spurn not the
blessing which yet remains. Instantly withdraw your fleets
and armies. Cultivate the friendship and commerce of America.
Thus and thus only can you hope to be great and happy. Seek
this in a commercial alliance-seek it ere it be too late, for
there only must you expect to find it. These are the undisguised sentiments of a man who rejoices not in bloodshed in this
fatal contest."*
These were momentous words, and they made their impression, not on Ministers and Administration men, but on the wise
and great men of England-Burke and Fox and Rockingham .
and Richmond and Conway-that small minority-fewer than
we arc now. They saw the inevitable future clearly, and
thought it the part of wisdom and statesmanship voluntarily
to say so, and not to be forced or shamed into it by the
action of other nations. The time however had not come.
Pharaoh's heart was still hard. National pride was tenacious
and resentful. A flash of eloquence from a decrepit and dying

* General Gates to Earl Thanet, Oct. 1771.
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statesman, who, in his heart detested the war, arrested the
counsels of moderation and stimulated the passion and fanaticism of the day; and a Stranger did recognize first-created for
itself a sympathy on this side of the Atlantic, which yet exists
-and the war went on for four years more, of blood, and sorrow, and shame, and debt, and at last Great Britain did, in
1782, what she could have better done in 1778.
PHILADELPHIA,
APRIL

10th, 1863.

